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Chapter One: Introduction
Introduction:
Contrary to the expectation of the Weberian model of the state, the state is not
the only provider of security and governance. This is prominent in states that
are categorized as weak or failed states especially those that witnessed a civil
conflict. The dynamics of internal conflicts and the power-relation among the
involved actors influence the post conflict peace-building process. The rebel
groups are among these influential actors. To avoid confusion between rebel
groups and other militant non-state actors, the rebel group is an organized armed
group that rises against incumbent government, other rebel groups or/and
external invasion. Its activities usually have a political motivation such as
fighting for political autonomy or asking for more rights for a specific
underrepresented ethnicity or minority group (Jo 2015, p. 36-37).
Although violence and battles are the main focus of civil conflicts, rebels who
control territories construct a form of governance to manage their relations with
the resident civilian population. The behaviour of rebels while interacting with
the population under their control ranges between violence and neglect to
cohabitation and cooperation. Much depends on the strategies of rebels.
However, a significant number of rebel groups provide the population under
their jurisdiction with some sort of governance that varies from providing basic
goods and services to establishing state-like institutions with bureaucracies,
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taxation system, schools, health system and even representative councils
(Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, p. 1-2).
In the middle of a protracted civil war, the conflict dynamics are usually
ambiguous, and rebel groups who seek survival have to interact with the
population under their control to ensure their support. They usually engage in
governance when they aim at gaining the support of the population under their
jurisdiction and mobilizing them against the incumbent government or other
rebel groups. Delivering governance is a complex interactive process that
requires bargaining and interdependence with different actors including
international ones. That is because the power structure is changeable so
sustainability requires continuous process of negotiations with civilian
constituencies, other rebel groups or in some cases with the incumbent
government. This means that there is no fixed strategy that rebels can apply to
gain this support or what can be called relative legitimacy since they are not an
internationally recognized sovereign authority. Rebels develop various
approaches and types of institutions over time and space based on the dynamics
of war and their goal as well. In case a rebel group succeeded in delivering a
more consistent governance than the incumbent government, this would help in
promoting the power of the rebel group and weakening the popularity of the
incumbent government. Nevertheless, while governance can help rebels in
achieving their interests, if they fail in governance, that will harm their insurgent
cause. In addition, the incumbent government or other rebels may use their
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weakness in governance to defeat them (Berti 2020, p. 2-3; Arjona, Kasfir, and
Mampilly 2015, p. 1-4).
However, some rebel groups manage to sustain their governance such as
Hezbollah and others cannot such as ISIS. Therefore, the main research question
that this thesis explores is: What are the factors that contribute to the
sustainability of rebel governance? This study will explore not only the
sustainability until the end of the civil war but also how this rebel group can
sustain its existence after the end of the war to get integrated in the post-war
political order. The study will examine the importance of gaining legitimacy for
governance sustainability, and explore the different strategies that rebels apply
to gain legitimacy from the population under their control. Additionally, it will
discuss how constructing institutions is substantial to sustain governance,
besides analysing the different types of institutions that rebels construct based
on the criteria of Mampilly and Stewart (2021) that will be discussed in later
chapter.
In order to answer these questions, the study will first discuss relevant theories
that tackled rebel governance, how rebels gain legitimacy and the importance
of institutionalization in sustainability. Then, it will examine Hezbollah in
Lebanon and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria in separate chapters.
The study will then compare the two cases to determine the factors that led to
the sustainability of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the possibility of the PYD to
sustain its governance and to get integrated in the post-war political order.
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The study will use qualitative research to explore the different case studies and
use a comparative approach to compare the two cases. The study builds on a
rich literature that discussed the rebels who govern, which is the focus of this
study.
1- Literature Review:
This review tackles the previous literature on rebel governance from different
perspectives. Exploring their strategies, their institutional framework, and the
sharing of governance between state and non-state actors. Afterwards, the
contribution of the study will be presented.
A. The Governance Strategies of Rebels
This section includes studies that discuss the different governance strategies
used by rebels in the territories under their control. These strategies can be
affected as Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly (2015) claim by natural resources,
ideologies, the responses of the population under their control and pre-existing
social order. It also depends on the time-frame, whether these actors have longterm or short-term goals/objectives. Arjona (2016) studied the case of Colombia
and argues that rebels conduct different governance strategies across time and
territories that they dominate depending on the pre-existing local governance
system of the area. She proposed a typology of social order in times of conflicts
as rebels with long-term strategies are under ‘order’ typology, which refers to
the adaption of civilian population with rebels. However, rebels with short-term
strategies could be categorized under ‘disorder typology’ because the
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population under their control do not accept their rule that is against the preexisting local system.
Besides, the type of rebels whether separatists or non-separatists is thought to
influence their desire to govern. Stewart (2017) conducted a quantitative
analysis using large N to study rebels from 1945 to 2003 and concluded that
secessionist rebels are more likely to provide goods and services inclusively
than non-secessionist rebels. That is because they want to gain more supporters
domestically and internationally for independence. However, she mentioned
that Hezbollah does not follow this pattern. Nevertheless, Florea (2020) argues
that separatists might not provide governance if they loot mineral resources and
they are more likely to govern if they receive external military support, have
access to relatively immobile assets, adopt a Marxist ideology, control the
territory for a long time or in presence of peacekeepers.
The conflict dynamics can also influence the strategies of rebels. Berti (2020)
studied the governance approaches of Jabhat al-Nusra in the Idlib and Aleppo
provinces between 2012 and 2017. She argued that both local and broader
conflict dynamics affect the governance arrangements in terms of alliances with
other armed groups or civilian agents of the population under their control. She
concluded that the actions of rebels evolved from cooperation at the beginning
of the Syrian Civil War to a competitive relationship over resources and
ideological differences because of these dynamics.
In addition, the ceasefire period as well has an effect on the rebel governance
strategies. Sosnowski (2018) argues that ceasefire is a complex process that
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does not only imply a temporarily halt to military clashes but also a chance or a
political tool that both rebels and incumbent government use to enhance their
governance in the territories under their jurisdiction. She examined this
assumption on the ceasefire that took place in Syria in 2016 especially in Daraa.
She concluded that distribution of humanitarian aid on the population fosters
the legitimacy of the governing actors and the activities that are conducted
during the ceasefire would change the dynamics of conflicts and power
afterwards.
Rebels adopt these strategies essentially to gain legitimacy. Cunningham and
Loyle (2020) argue that rebels can gain legitimacy if the people under their
jurisdiction believe that their governance is more effective than the incumbent
state. This could be through establishing judicial system and paying reparation
for the population under their jurisdiction who were affected from civil wars.
They can also publicize the support of their population to gain international
recognition. Similarly, Malejacq (2017) argues that rebels do not only construct
legitimacy through providing goods and services to the people under their
jurisdiction but also through using diplomatic tools to publicise their cause
externally with international actors. An example of this is the Afghan warlord
Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was able to negotiate with the United State and
reached the European and American media to defend his cause.
Additionally, Terpstra (2020) argues that Taliban used different strategies to
gain legitimacy throughout its history of governance. He claims that there are
mainly two strategies. First, the pragmatic strategy through which Taliban
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provide the people with goods, services and most importantly relative secured
environment -rule of law. Second, the moral strategy through which they
publicise that they are the protectors of Islam and/or nation against the foreign
invaders. Additionally, the author concluded that external intervention harm the
pragmatic strategy, because rebels would spend their resources in clashes and
might not be able to provide the people with goods and services. However, the
foreign intervention would fuel the moral strategy, because the people would be
encouraged to support and join the group against the intervention to defend their
national or ideological cause.
Nevertheless, Revkin (2021) argues based on studying ISIS, the population
under the control of a rebel group is more likely to accept and stay under its rule
because of ‘competitive governance’, which means that rebels provide them
with services that are more effective and fairer than the incumbent state. She
claims that this assumption is more valid than other explanations such as
economic resources, ideology, familial ties, information or threat perception.
On the other hand, it is controversial whether rebels can gain legitimacy through
violence and forcing people under their control to obey them or not. Revkin and
Ahram (2020) argue that in some cases rebels construct a social contract with
the population under their jurisdiction to gain legitimacy. They examined the
case of ISIS in order to test whether they gain legitimacy through consent or
coercion. They concluded that ISIS claimed that it gained legitimacy through
public consent, however, the responses of the population who lived under its
rule proved that they consented out of fear not loyalty. Therefore, its social
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contract is similar to the social contract of authoritative regimes that is based on
subordination and use of force. However, Terpstra and Frerks (2017) argue that
rebels cannot depend on coercion only to get the consent of the people because
coercion is not a sustainable tool of governance. Therefore, rebels who seek
sustainability rely on a mixture of coercion and persuasion, which can be
ideological or materialist – providing goods and services-.
B. The Institutional Organization of Rebels:
This

section

presents

the

studies

that

tackle

the

importance

of

institutionalization in rebel governance. Arjona (2016), Cunningham and Loyle
(2020) and Mampilly and Stewart (2021) argue that in civil wars, some rebels
conduct non-militant actions such as providing social services to the people
under their jurisdiction and the construction of local political institutions that
run the territory under their control. The state-like institutionalized governance
aims at maintaining their rule over the population and create a channel of
communication with them. However, they differ in the design and the level of
institutionalization ranging from local representative councils to autocratic
rebel leadership. These studies assume that these institutions range from martial
law to inclusion of the population under their rule, and that one rebel group
might acquire different types across territories and over time. They studied how
different types were formed by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Islamic State
(IS), Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) Gerakan Aceh Merdekafree (GAM),
Khmer Rouge (KR), African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape
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Verde (PAIGC). However, they did not explain why rebels choose certain type
over another and which type is more sustainable.
Cunningham, Huang and Sawyer (2021) found a correlation between the
institutional capacity of rebels and their participation in elections. They argue
that rebels participate in elections during wartime in order to gain or/and
maintain both domestic and international recognition. However, fundamentally,
they need to have organizational institutions to be able to prepare themselves
for elections, but such elections might be a financial burden on the rebels and
risky in case they lost the elections. The paper examined its assumption with a
large N analysis of rebels who conducted elections from 1950 until 2006. The
study concluded that rebels with organized institution who have a wide range
of supporters, have strong relations with external actors and seek to consolidate
their legitimacy are the ones who hold elections. However, Cunningham and
Loyle (2020) claim that participating in elections that are prepared by the
incumbent state might reduce their legitimacy.
Some studies found a relationship between complex institutional dynamics on
the one hand and governance and legitimacy maintenance on the other.
Baylouny (2014) examined the armed non-state actors or what she called armed
political parties (APPs) in Lebanon during the civil war. She claims that the
APPs -with their different ideologies- have complex institutional dynamics and
hierarchies that were able to provide alternative governance to the weak
government. Additionally, some of them were able to sustain their governance
such as Hezbollah. She concluded that because of their organized institutions,
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they were able to gain legitimacy from the citizens under their jurisdiction.
Similarly, DeVore and Stähli (2015) and DeVore, Stähli and Franke (2019)
argue that the complex organizational networks of Hezbollah that was
developed since 1982 and its ability to innovate governance techniques are the
reason behind its sustainability and that the Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah
was only an assistant factor to its prolonged existence.
C. Governance Sharing between State and Non-State Actors:
This section tackles studies that present the relation between state and non-state
actors and how the cooperation between them would foster governance delivery
to the people and vice versa. One of the prominent case studies concerning state
and non-state actors’ cooperation in governance is the de-facto state of
Somaliland. Moe and Simojoki (2013) and Garcia (2017) Gandrup and Titeca
(2019) argue that Somaliland conducted a successful and unique hybrid political
system that consists of traditional systems of clans and a state-like system,
which is against the ethnocentric biased strategies that the international
community attempts to apply in Somalia. When the international community
was trying to create a Weberian model of state -monopoly of power in hands of
the state- in Somalia, Somaliland depended on state and non-state local actors.
They were able to provide services during the civil war, whereas other areas of
Somalia suffered from famine and lack of goods and services. This can be
considered as a post-colonial perspective in governance in failed states. In
addition, Musaa and Horst (2019) argue that the local businessmen in
Somaliland contribute to the economic development sector as well as
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preventing and resolving conflicts in alliance with the de facto government. On
the other hand, Renders and Terlinden (2010) claimed that although the hybrid
system was able to contain conflicts and deliver services to the people, it is not
sustainable. That is because of the ambition of new politicians who are trying
to marginalize the role of clan elders. That could renew the conflict again in
Somaliland at any point of time.
Some studies argue that Lebanon at some stage had a unique hybrid system of
cooperation. Hazbun (2016) and Geha (2019) argue that Hezbollah could be
analysed from different perspective other than a violent non-state actor because
it is not challenging the national security of Lebanon. On the contrary, it is part
of a ‘hybrid sovereignty’ dynamic, and it operates alongside with the plural
security governance system. They also claim that despite that this system is run
by competing domestic actors, it is effective to an extent in facing some
geopolitical threats such as ISIS even more than other authoritarian regimes in
the region because of the bargaining and negotiations mechanisms that they
adopt.
Other studies highlight the risk of not integrating non-state actors in governance
post-war period. Brown, Trinkunas and Hamid (2017) examined the role of
armed non-state actors in governance during civil conflicts and how the neglect
of some of them in the post-war peace process threatens the stability of the state.
They argue that rebels establish governance after consolidating their control
over certain territory, and they often tend to create links with the local
communities and elders to gain their support. The paper discussed the cases of
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Afghanistan and Colombia. They claim that the Taliban group in Afghanistan
provided governance to the people under its jurisdiction in a more efficient way
than the incumbent government and as a result, they accept its presence in some
areas than the government. However, when the government encountered the
Taliban instead of negotiating with them, Taliban used violence even without
considering civilian population. The Colombian case has the same pattern as
well. They concluded that the government elites ought to share governance with
non-armed non-state actors in order not to give the chance for armed groups to
rise and fill the gap in their governance. Klick (2016) as well shows how the
development of local governance varies across Guatemala based on the degree
of cooperation between state and non-state actors. He argues that local
governance in Guatemala was more efficient when the state actors cooperate
with traditional leaders and non-state actors to help them in mobilizing the
people and overseeing the distribution of resources. However, in areas where
the state and non-state actors are in clash, the local development is hindered.
The lack of cooperation could be a result of rivalry during civil wars. Deasy
(2013) explained the obstacles that face local councils in Syria and how that
hindered their governance in areas where Assad had no authority over. These
range from the brutal confrontations with Assad’s army or with other militias to
the lack of resources. She concluded that the complex environment in Syria is
not allowing the non-state actors to learn how to self-govern. Martínez and Eng
(2018) also claim that the systematic bombarding of Assad’s army on the rebels’
regions aims at destroying any chance of sustaining rebel or local governance
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in order to prove that they cannot protect the population under their control and
lose their legitimacy that was driven from the acceptance of this population.
However, Assad’s strategy could lead to two possibilities whether the civilians
delegitimatize the rebels that are supposedly protecting them, so they will be
weakened or mobilize against Assad’s army and join the rebel groups.
D. The Contribution of the Study:
The previous studies have a number of important questions that remain
unanswered. Despite presenting the different legitimacy-gaining strategies and
the types of institutions that the rebels adopt, they did not evaluate which set of
strategies is more important to sustain rebel governance and whether the type
of the institutions contributes to the sustainability of rebel governance or not.
This study will fill the gap by examining in depth Hezbollah’s governance
activities in Lebanon and how it sustained its rule even after the end of the war.
The study will focus as well on an under-research case, which is the Democratic
Union Party in Syria, and it will attempt to analyse its governance capacities.
Afterwards, a comparative study will be conducted to conclude a set of
strategies that might lead to rebel governance sustainability.
2- Methodological Approaches:
This study uses a case study research design, which according to George (1979)
is useful in examining the validity of theoretical questions empirically (George
as cited in Levy 2008, p. 2). Levy (2008) categorizes the theory-guided case
studies as idiographic case studies that seek to explain or describe a specific
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case study. This type of study does not aim at generalization but rather focuses
on a case within time and space limits to conclude whether the theory is
applicable in reality or not (Levy 2008, p. 3-4). Levy argues that “the more case
interpretations are guided by theory, the more explicit their underlying analytic
assumptions, normative biases, and causal propositions; the fewer their logical
contradictions; and the easier they are to empirically validate or invalidate”
(Levy 2008, p. 5).
The study is a qualitative study. It will analyse the following sources:
1- Secondary literature: academic studies related to rebel governance
theories and studies that focus on Hezbollah and the Democratic Union
Party.
2- Primary sources: Gather data through newspaper reports and the official
websites of the rebels. Additionally, speeches of the leaders especially
Nasrallah since he became a Secretary-General until 2022, and speeches
of prominent leaders in the PYD such as Saleh Muslim and others until
2022 as well.
The study will examine each rebel group separately based on the theoretical
framework. Afterwards, it will use comparative approach to compare Hezbollah
in Lebanon and the Democratic Union Party in Syria.
The case of Hezbollah in Lebanon is an important unique case of a rebel group
that sustained its institutional organization even after the end of the war and
constructed an official political party that has seats in the Lebanese Parliament.
Additionally, it is not disarmed until now. Therefore, it is a model of a militant
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non-state actor which sustained its governance and violence activities even after
the peace process.
The purpose of selecting the Democratic Union Party in Syria is exploring an
understudied case in rebel governance because the Syrian Civil War is still
ongoing and recent to an extent. Additionally, it is considered a unique case
because it is surrounded with variety of militant non-state actors which emerged
since the civil war with different motivations.
Selecting both case studies will hold some variables constant because both of
them witnessed civil conflict, and they both have ideological motivation.
Additionally, the sustainability strategies and factors of Hezbollah will clarify
the potentiality of the Democratic Union Party to sustain its control like
Hezbollah.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework
Introduction
The prevalence of civil wars especially after the Cold War led to the rise of
rebels who control parts of national states in the absence or weakness of the
central government, which became unable to impose the rule of law and
monopolize the use of force. Therefore, scholars who are interested in studying
civil wars started to give more attention to how these rebels function after
controlling a territory. Additionally, they question whether these groups aim to
govern or their ambitions are more short-term (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly
2015, p. 1-4). The study will draw on the work of Kasfir (2015) and his
definition of rebel governance, which will be discussed in this chapter.
Rebel groups that strive to sustain its governance have to design strategies in
accordance with their priorities and ultimate objective. These strategies may be
changeable over time and space to correspond with the dynamics of the conflict.
In order to consolidate governance, first, rebels need to gain legitimacy from
the people that they govern because it is the fundamental base of sustainability.
Second, similar to states, rebels need to construct institutions in order to manage
and embed governance, and it is built to serve the grand agenda of the group
(Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015, p. 1-4).
This chapter will tackle a number of theories, definitions and criteria that will
be used to answer the research question “What are the factors that contribute to
the sustainability of rebel governance?”. The chapter will be divided into three
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main parts. First, defining what is rebel governance and what are the criteria
that rebel groups need to fulfil to pursue governance. Second, discussing the
dilemma of legitimacy and the different strategies that they use to gain
legitimacy. Third, examining the importance of the rebel institutions in
sustaining governance as well as the types and dimensions of rebel institutions
that were developed by Mampilly and Stewart (2021) that will be applied on the
case studies to test whether these dimensions contribute to governance
sustainability or not.
This chapter will attempt to hypothesize based on the theories and definitions
how a rebel group can sustain its governance for longer periods.
1- Defining Rebel Governance:
As previously mentioned, there are several types of armed non-state actors.
However, this study focuses only on rebel groups who are armed non-state
actors who mobilize against the central government, other rebel group or/and
external actors. Some rebel groups are merely driven by greed, which are not
the focus of this study. This study focuses on the rebel groups who have
grievance motivation and seek to change the relationship between the state and
society specifically those groups who represent an underrepresented group (Jo
2015, p. 36-37; Sobek and Payne 2010, p. 214).
Since not all rebels seek governance, rebel governance needs to be identified.
According to Kasfir (2015), a broad definition of rebel governance would be
“the organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for a public purpose”
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(Kasfir 2015, P.24). There are three main conditions that rebels have to fulfil in
order to govern. First, they need to control a territory within the state where the
rebellion takes place, but the territory size may change over time based on the
dynamics of the internal conflict. Second, civilian population must exist in this
territory, and in case they occupied an unpopulated territory, it would not be
considered as rebel governance. Third, they have to use violence whether
against the incumbent government, other rebel groups or/and the civilian
population in order to maintain or/and expand the territory under their control
(Kasfir 2015, P.25).
Primarily, rebels construct a form of government that helps them to achieve
their interests. Therefore, in order to maintain their control, they provide goods
and services -infrastructure, health and education-, besides creating institutions
to stabilize order inside their jurisdiction to persuade the population that they
can be an alternative for the incumbent government. In some cases, they induce
the population under their control to participate with them in governance or
maintain the pre-existing local system. However, they also control the civilian
production of wealth, collect taxes from the population and even force the
civilian population to work in illegal trafficking (Kasfir 2015, P.21-27).
Rebel governance can be perceived as series of organization arrangements that
is driven from the daily interactions between rebels and the population under
their rule, which may vary from coercion to persuasion in order to gain
legitimacy from the population. These interactions between both sides shape the
governance structure and its prospects to be sustained. However, governing
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does not necessary mean that rebels gained legitimacy but legitimacy is
necessary to sustain their governance (Kasfir as cited in Terpstra and Frerks
2017, p. 284).
The following section will question the legitimacy of rebel groups, how
legitimacy is an essential condition for sustaining governance, and the strategies
that they use to reach their goal.
2- The Dilemma of Legitimacy:
Gaining Legitimacy is a process or a bundle of interactive actions that aims at
convincing the people that such actor is the rightful ruler that they need to trust
and obey. Legitimacy depends on the belief of the people in the material and
moral validity of the ruling organization and its activities. It is a social relation
that embodies tangible social interactions, facilitates social control, and
represents a mutual relationship where the ruler and the ruled affect each other.
However, the predominant studies on legitimacy are associated with the state,
and studying the concept in relation to non-state actors is relatively limited
(Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 670-678; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 413).
With the rise of non-state actors’ governance, the idea of questioning the ruler
rightfulness became more of a traditional approach. Substantially, legitimacy is
perceived as the psychological acquisition of authority, social order and
institutions to the extent of convincing the people under their jurisdiction that
their rule is proper and just. It is not a mere believe that this group gains
legitimacy but it is about how its practices are convincible enough to be
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perceived as a legitimate ruler. Rebels as non-state political actors were able in
a considerable number of cases to provide alternative governance in the absence
of the formal internationally recognized state institutions. However, these rebel
groups have to fulfil the three fundamental elements that Nelson Kasfir
identified to be considered as governors, which are territory, civilian residence,
and the use of violence. Although the legitimacy of the internationally
recognized state is different than illegal rebel groups, rebels may gain
changeable degrees of legitimacy among defined local constituencies and may
gain international support (Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 671-673; Kasfir 2015, P. 28;
Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 285).
According to Klaus Schlichte and Ulrich Schneckener (2015), rebels -similar to
state actors- have to give justification for their actions to gain material and
ideological support because legitimacy is the foundational step upon which
governance is built, and without being legitimate, the group is less likely to
sustain its governance. Rebels who sustain their existence for a prolonged
period in civil wars often have gained a solid form of legitimacy inside the
territories under their jurisdiction. The internal stability allowed them to
concentrate on maintaining and investing more in enhancing their
organisational structure and military capacity. However, it should be noted that
gaining legitimacy is not a guarantee that the group will be sustainable but
without it the rebel quest is expected to fail (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015,
p. 409-410).
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H1: a rebel group that could not gain minimal legitimacy is less likely to sustain
its governance.
Rebels who seek to consolidate their governance would create a set of strategies
to gain legitimacy, which is changeable based on the time and space. However,
substantially, the rebel group needs to have negotiation skills to adapt with
social, political, and territorial changes that take place during the civil war
(Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 680).
H2: a rebel group that cannot negotiate with its allies and enemies is less likely
to sustain its governance.
The following sections will tackle the major strategies that rebels conduct to
gain and maintain their legitimacy. First, discussing how to create a narrative,
second, the economic strategies, third, the violence dilemma, and forth how they
manage their international relations.
A. Creating A Narrative:
The state-building process requires creating a narrative that bonds the people
together and grants the ruler the legitimacy to develop the state. This narrative
could be driven from pre-existing social norms upon which legitimacy would
be built. Similarly, the rebels as political actors need to create the narrative that
justifies their possession of power, their actions and agendas. That is because
they are like other political actors as they need the moral and material support
to shift from having fragile power to a more prolonged rule (Duyvesteyn 2017,
p. 671; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410).
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Rebels could claim that they are representatives of political or socio-economic
grievances in the country based on an ethnic group, a religious sect, a social
class, or claiming that their cause is driven from popular culture and traditions
to gain legitimacy. The rebel group could also create a narrative of ‘us’ versus
‘other’ relationship by presenting the other side -whether the incumbent
government, other rebel groups or even external actors- as brutal enemies that
need to be encountered (Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 285).
H3: a rebel group that has an identity similar to the population under its
jurisdiction is more likely to gain more legitimacy.
Another narrative could be creating the myth of heroism and martyrdom that
some rebels use to express their readiness to scarify their lives to defend their
cause so they appear as the defenders of the people (Terpstra and Frerks 2017,
p. 285).
H4: rebel groups that are showing themselves as the defenders of the nation are
more likely to gain more legitimacy.
A solid narrative needs a charismatic leader who has the ability to mobilize and
recruit people for the interest of the group by using rhetorical speeches and has
the ability to alter political strategies and practices in accordance with the
conflict dynamics to consolidate its rule. This leader might as well create a
legacy that would be followed by his successors (Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p.
285; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 418).
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H5: A rebel group that has a charismatic leader is more likely to sustain its
governance.
In order to consolidate this narrative, a social contract that consists of values,
norms and regulations needs to be established by the actor who seeks
governance, which is an instrument to consolidate legitimacy. However, this
actor needs to gain credibility first to be able to establish a legitimate rule
(Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 679). This social contract needs to be accepted by the
masses, and according to Gramsci, the modern states consolidate their
hegemony not only through coercion but also through manipulation of masses.
In other words, the political elites create cultural hegemony to dominate the
people by persuading them with the ideology of the ruling class to get their
consent (Gramsci as cited in Mampilly 2015, p. 78). This means that if an actor
seeks governance and legitimacy, coercion is not enough and gaining consent
through symbolic actions is necessary. These symbols could be nationalist or
ideological sentiments, which will promote their narrative. Since rebel groups
are socially constructed organizations that have a general agenda that aims at
gathering individuals into a collective coalition, they can use the same strategies
of the state to gain relative legitimacy. Some rebels use social, political and
aesthetic symbols in order to claim being sovereign and legitimate through
mimicking the practices and symbols of modern states such as creating anthems,
slogans, official flag, parades, printing currency and using the different media
channels to promulgate these symbols. These symbols should help in
stimulating the emotional response of the audiences towards the organization
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(Mampilly 2015, p. 77-80; Podder 2014, p. 222). In other words, “Legitimacy
arises not merely from coincident preferences between a ruler and the ruled, but
as a result of the symbolic processes a regime deploys to give a meaning to these
preferences” (Mampilly 2015, p. 80).
The symbolic process creates a communication bridge between the rebels and
the population under their jurisdiction, which fosters the relation and the bond
between them. This will allow the rebel group to reduce the reliance on force to
assure compliance, which will increase the voluntary recruitment because the
people have a sense of belonging to the rebel group. In addition, the rebel group
will ensure the loyalty of the population under its jurisdiction. The difference
between the compliance that is a result of coercion and the one of creating
common identity ground is that the latter is driven from preference, which is
more rooted in the society. Both coercion and symbolic actions will consolidate
the social order created by the rebel group. However, rebels need to cautious if
their audience have different identities, which means that they need to create
different symbolic actions that unite all these audiences under their rule
(Mampilly 2015, p. 76-81). However, according to Suchman (1995), a political
actor that is seeking legitimacy needs at first to consolidate its narrative among
the pre-existing primary audience, then it would search for audiences that might
accept the current practices, afterwards, it can develop new practices to attract
more audiences (Suchman 1995, p. 587).
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H6: a rebel group that is able to create a solid narrative supported with
symbolic actions is more likely to gain legitimacy and sustain its governance.
However, the symbolic actions are not by itself sufficient to gain legitimacy as
they need to be combined with material actions as well, which will be discussed
in the following section.
B. Economic Strategies:
The economic incentives are among the substantive factors that need to be
examined while studying civil wars and rebel governance. Some scholars like
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that rebels are more likely to rise in countries
that depend on exporting raw materials and suffer from high unemployment
rates, illiteracy, and economic, ethnic and religious inequalities. They argue that
rebels are only driven by greed of exploiting the resources of the country and
seize the grievances of a specific group to provoke a war (Collier and Hoeffler
2004, p. 587-589). However, Regan and Norton (2005) argue that some rebels
do not only aim at exploiting resources especially in countries that are not rich
in resources that could be looted but they may rise to represent an ethnic or
religious group that is underrepresented and deprived from gaining equal rights.
In later stages, they would need to extract resources for their governance
purposes (Regan and Norton 2005, p. 319).
It should be noted as well that not all rebels pursue governance, Arjona (2016)
argues that rebels who have long-term strategies are more likely to impose order
and establish governance to gain the people’s support. However, those who
have short-term strategies and aim only at looting the natural resources are less
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likely to provide services to the people under their jurisdiction (Arjona 2016, p.
3). The latter type is not of the concern of this study.
Governance is primarily about delivering goods, service and security, which is
the base of a legitimate political order. This mission is more challenging for a
rebel group than a state because it has limited capacity and funds, in a state of
war, and is illegitimate by international law (Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 679). Rebels
with governance intentions usually start providing goods and services after
consolidating their control over a territory that contains civilian population. The
basic goods and services include security, food, water, medical care, and
infrastructure -which is important due to the destructive nature of wars(Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 418) This strategy according to Terpstra
(2020) is called ‘pragmatic strategy’ (Terpstra 2020, p. 1145). Rebels are more
likely to gain popular legitimacy if they provide services in a more persistent
way than the incumbent government, which is called ‘competitive governance’
(Revkin 2021, p. 47). In other words, if the incumbent government attacks the
civilian population or neglects them, they are more likely to support the rebel
group that supplies them with services and protects them. However, in case the
rebels stop delivering services, their popularity is more likely to decrease
(Podder 2014, p. 219-221).
H7: rebel groups who are willing to provide the people under their jurisdiction
with consistent goods and services are more likely to gain legitimacy.
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Rebels who govern usually construct a parallel economic sector to be able to
finance their agenda including delivering services and security. One of the
profitable sources of funding is extractable natural resources such as oil, gas
and diamonds. Rebels trade illegally in such resources if they have access to
them. Some rebel groups engage in drug and human trafficking as a source of
finance especially in countries that lack natural resources. They also depend on
internal extraction of funds such as taxes, which is considered as a way to show
their sovereignty and ability to collect taxes from the people under their
jurisdiction. In some cases, rebels seize the humanitarian aid that is sent by
international NGOs. In addition, some rebel groups are financially supported
from external sources whether from a foreign sponsor country or from groups
in other countries that share similar identity such as diasporas. This external
support is an important factor of sustainability as well because it guarantees the
flaw of financial assistance that is substantial for recruiting, enhancing the
military capacity and providing services (Cosmo, Fassin and Pinaud 2021, p.
64; Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Turkmani 2018, p. 54-56).
H8: Rebels who receive consistent external financial assistance are more likely
to sustain their governance.
Domestically, rebels depend and interact with population under their rule for
sources extraction and this relation might be by force, persuasion, or a mix
between the two approaches, which will be discussed in detail in the next
section.
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C. Violence Reconsidered:
Political actors who use violence extensively find it usually difficult to gain
legitimacy because it is always questionable; violence against whom and how
it is justified. Rebels might need to use violence to establish the social order
which is a substantial base in the process of legitimacy, and the population’s
acceptance and participation in this order are confirming this legitimacy.
However, violence can legitimize or delegitimize them, therefore, rebels need
to be cautious with using violence against the population under their
jurisdiction. That is because the excessive and unjustified use of violence would
delegitimize their existence as the people would feel unsafe and threatened.
They have to give justification for the use of violence, which often is justified
by a narrative that they are protecting the community to survive and calling
those who are oppressed as traitors. This narrative needs to be solid enough and
backed by charismatic political elites who can convince the people with ideas
and symbols, otherwise, their legitimacy will decline and might fade.
Legitimacy will also be affected if the use of violence continued for long periods
and was indiscriminate (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410-416;
Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 679).
Wood (2010) argues that if a rebel group enjoys wide support from the
population under its jurisdiction, it is less likely to use excessive violence
against it. In addition, some rebel groups use indiscriminate violence due to
their weak institutional capacity regarding service provision and security,
besides their inability to persuade the population with their agenda. Instead of
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using a mix between violence and persuasion to manipulate the masses, they
use only violence (Wood 2010, p. 602). The relation between the civilian
population and rebels is not a one-way relationship where such population
depends on rebels. However, the rebels need the population under their control
as well because they are a source of production and potential recruits as well
(Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 283). According to Suchman (1995), people tend
to supply resources to the organization that is desirable and proper in the sense
of providing services, consistent with the embedded social system and not using
extensive violence (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Most importantly a ruler without
followers might not be able to reach the planned goals (Terpstra and Frerks
2017, p. 283).
Revkin and Ahram (2020) argue that rebels can construct a social contract
similar to the one of the authoritative regimes, which is built upon subjection
and coercion (Revkin and Ahram 2020, p. 1-2). However, rebels are different
than a state because the rebels by law are illegitimate and need to seek
legitimacy to consolidate its rule. Therefore, if they aim to stabilize their
governance on the long-term, they need to use a strategy that combines both
coercion and persuasion and even authoritative states apply that (Terpstra and
Frerks 2017, p. 280). In addition, governments that only rely on coercion use
more resources in surveillance to monitor their population in order to keep
punishing any violator of their rules. On the other hand, governments that rely
on a mix between coercion and persuasion invest less in such surveillance
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system and invest more on other strategies to protect itself from internal and
external threats as well (Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009, p. 355).
H9: Rebels who use a mix of coercion and persuasion are more likely to sustain
their governance.
The indiscriminate excessive use of violence will lead to compliance out of fear
but not sustainable legitimacy that is based on loyalty and the belief that this
ruling organization has the right to rule. If the constituents obey the ruling
organization out of fear, they will not support it in case there is a danger that
threatens its rule, and they might support other groups to get rid of such violent
ruler. In addition, the extreme use of violence contributes to the movement of
civilian population out of territory of the violent actor (Revkin 2021, p. 48-49).
Moreover, if the rebel group recruits the civilian residents forcibly, they will be
less loyal than those who would be recruited voluntarily because they do not
believe in the cause that they fight for (Wood 2010, p. 603).
H10: Rebels who use excessive unjustified violence against the population
under their control are less likely to sustain their governance.
Some rebel groups would take a corrective path to prevent being delegitimized
after using violence by setting trials to selective leaders who used excessive
violence against the population under their rule, executing new rules that respect
human rights and limit the use of violence, and some of them declare their
respect to international humanitarian laws and regulations such as the Geneva
Conventions. This would help in consolidating the local legitimacy and
attracting more international support (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 416).

33

D. International Relations:
Rebel groups who seek governance need to define the targeted audiences,
whether they are only targeting the local audiences or international ones as well.
According to Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), rebel groups need both
national and international audiences in a consistent way if they want to
consolidate their governance (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410). They
need to use symbolic actions like speeches and publicise their respect to
international humanitarian law, which will help them to receive funds as well
as a degree of political recognition that is driven from the communication
process with international actors without questioning their legal status. Some
rebel groups as well might formulate their foreign policy agenda while
addressing the international community and might conduct diplomatic talks
with international actors. These actions would foster their cause because they
normatively are perceived as the opposite of the state, unofficial and
illegitimate, and by being recognized internationally, that will empower them
to participate in the negotiations in post-war settlement (Mampilly 2015, p. 86;
Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 420; Malejacq 2017, p. 870).
H11: the rebel group that has better relations with foreign states, international
aid organisation, translational NGOs, and international media is more likely to
sustain its governance.
On the other hand, some of the rebel groups publicise their enmity to the
Western great powers as a strategy to gain more internal support. This strategy
is called ‘moral strategy’ according to Terpstra (2020). Rebels use their enmity
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to Western great powers to advertise that they defend the nation or specific
identity inside the nation. It is stimulated during foreign interventions because
the people perceive such group as the defender of the nation especially if this
foreign power is interfering militarily (Terpstra 2020, p. 1145).
H12: Rebels who create a common foreign enemy are more likely to gain
internal legitimacy.
To sum up this section, the rebel group that seeks legitimacy needs to create a
set of strategies that is compatible with the war dynamics in its country in order
to sustain its governance. To implement and embed such activities, it needs to
construct institutions that might mimic the state institutions to be able to
compete with the state and embed its hegemony.
3- Rebel Institutions:
In order for a rebel group to conduct governance, it has to establish institutions
to manage its relation with the civilian population under its jurisdiction.
According to Podder (2014), rebel governance could be defined as “a series of
institutions established by an insurgent organisation to manage relations within
civilians living in the territory under its control that set-in place a system of
taxation and a series of rules (formal/informal) for governing civilian life.”
(Podder 2014, p.219).
The role of institutions is very important in sustaining the rebel governance
because they resemble the organizational capacity of the rebel group and its
ability to distribute the public goods as well as being representable
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internationally to defend its cause (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, p. 18). The
organizational capacity is an important factor to sustain the rebel governance
because it does not only help the rebel group to interact with the population
under its rule but to be more advanced in its military capacity in order to be able
to defend the territory under its control (Kasfir 2015, P. 28).
These institutions are established to maintain the social order created by the
rebel group and to implement its grand agenda. Although they are considered
as informal institutions since they operate against the incumbent internationally
recognized government, they might mimic the state institutions such as creating
national governments and local governments (Albert 2022, p. 2-3). They also
could initiate formal procedures such as local elections and election inside the
rebel administration hierarchy (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 418).
Rebels construct different types of institutions, service institutions such as
health, education housing, and infrastructure, administrative ones, and
institutions to enforce law such as the police and the judicial institutions (Albert
2022, p. 3-4). Such institutions help as well in sustaining governance because
they organize the daily interactions with the citizens who grant the rebels
legitimacy, which in turn sustain governance.
H13: The more the rebel institutions mimic the state institutions, the more the
rebel group sustains its governance.
On the other hand, Mampilly and Stewart (2021) argue that there are different
typologies to rebel institutions, which vary according to four dimensions; the
power sharing, integration, innovation and inclusiveness. By power sharing,
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they mean whether rebels prefer to apply absolute martial law or share some
power with the population under their control. However, the integration
dimension indicates the level of power sharing between rebels and population
under their control in administrating the rebel territory. The highest level of
integration is the collaboration between rebels and population under their rule
whether through the pre-existing traditional councils or forming councils of
representatives of the civilian population who can govern alongside rebels. On
the other side, the minimum level of integration is limiting the population’s
participation to certain administrative matters without engaging them in security
and substantive matters (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, p. 19).
For the innovation dimension, it refers to whether rebels will maintain the status
quo of the pre-exiting institutions after integrating the population under their
control in governance or whether they will modify the inherited institutions to
cope with the rebel political arrangement and strategies. Nevertheless, the
extreme level of innovation would be the establishment of new institutions that
serve their strategies (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, p. 19).
Regarding the inclusiveness dimension, it is about the extent to which the rebel
institutions are constructed to facilitate civil participation such as allowing the
population under their control to participate in the decision making or holding
elections on the local level as well as including civilian population from
different ethnicities, religions and genders in the institutions. The highly
inclusive model would include different demographic groups in decision
making, but the less inclusive model limits the representation to economic or
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political elites or over-represent a demographic group over the others
(Mampilly and Stewart 2021, p. 19).
Mampilly and Stewart (2021) did not argue which type in each dimension is
more sustainable than the other. However, the study will attempt to determine
the types of institutions that each case study establish and conclude which type
is more sustainable. Additionally, it will examine whether these dimensions
matter by their own or there are set of actions and practices that determine the
survival of the rebel group.
All of the hypotheses of this study are summarized in the following table.
Table 1: Rebel Governance Sustainability Hypotheses:
1- Rebel Legitimacy:

2- Rebel Institutions:

H1: a rebel group that could not gain H13: The more the rebel institutions
minimal legitimacy is less likely to mimic the state institutions, the more
sustain its governance.

the

rebel

H2: a rebel group that cannot governance.
negotiate with its allies and enemies
is

less

likely

to

sustain

its

governance.
A. Creating A Narrative:
H3: a rebel group that has an identity
similar to the civilians under its
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group

sustains

its

jurisdiction is more likely to gain
more legitimacy.
H4: rebel groups that are showing
themselves as the defenders of the
nation are more likely to gain more
legitimacy.
H5: A rebel group that has a
charismatic leader is more likely to
sustain its governance.
H6: a rebel group that is able to
create a solid narrative supported
with symbolic actions is more likely
to gain legitimacy and sustain its
governance.

B. Economic Strategies:
H7: rebel groups who are willing to
provide the people under their
jurisdiction with consistent goods
and services are more likely to gain
legitimacy.
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H8: Rebels who receive consistent
external financial assistance are
more

likely

to

sustain

their

governance.
C. Violence Reconsidered:
H9: Rebels who use a mix of coercion
and persuasion are more likely to
sustain their governance.
H10: Rebels who use excessive
unjustified violence against civilians
are less likely to sustain their
governance.
D. International Relations:
H11: the rebel group that has better
relations

with

international

foreign
aid

translational

states,

organisation,

NGOs,

and

international media is more likely to
sustain its governance.
H12: Rebels who create a common
foreign enemy are more likely to gain
internal legitimacy.

40

Conclusion:
Since the studies on rebel governance are relatively limited, this chapter
attempted to highlight the most relevant definitions, theories and criteria that
could be used in discussing the rebel governance in the selected case studies.
Case studies will be selected based on the three criteria of Kasfir (2015) that
were discussed above, which are territory, civilian population and the use of
violence, besides, the group has to exist long enough to be studied as well.
In order for a rebel group to sustain governance, it has to gain a degree of
legitimacy from the population under its jurisdiction. Since legitimacy is not
static, rebel groups who seek governance need to diversify their sources of
legitimacy and to be flexible to adjust them depending on the nature of the
surrounding environment. In some cases, legitimacy would be temporarily
driven by an immediate threat such as a foreign occupation or violence from the
incumbent government or other rebel groups. The civilian population in such
cases gives legitimacy to the group that is willing to defend them. However, this
legitimacy would be destructed if the threat faded and the rebel group failed to
generate different sources of legitimacy that would persuade the population
under its control to continue legitimizing them as a ruler. In addition, if a rebel
group only use coercion and violence to consolidate its rule, its existence will
not last for longer because consent is required to ensure the loyalty of the
people. Loyalty and legitimacy are important for sustainable governance
because any strategies implemented by rebel groups need to be recognized by
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the targeted audience, otherwise, they will not be able to gain any degree of
legitimacy and their governance will fall after a short period of time.
It should be noted as well that while symbolic actions are substantial for
consolidating legitimacy, it is more important in the formation stage to prioritize
material actions because goods and services are more important to the people in
war time. In later stages, the symbolic actions will be necessary to bond with
the civilian population to guarantee their support and maintain being legitimate.
Rebel groups that seek sustainability need also to construct institutions that
could serve its grand agenda and consolidate its identity and rules. Some rebel
groups mimic the state institutions to show their ability to challenge the
incumbent government.
This study will attempt to examine the degree of sustainability of two case
studies Hezbollah of Lebanon and the Democratic Union Party of Syria based
on the above-mentioned hypotheses that are driven from the mentioned theories
and definitions. Each case study will be examined by providing a brief history
of its emergence and how the factors around its establishment affected its
attempts to consolidate governance. Then, the legitimacy-gaining strategies that
were used by the case as well as its organizational capacity will be discussed.
Finally, the study will attempt to compare the two case studies in terms of
sustainability prospects for each case.
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Chapter Three: Hezbollah Governance in Lebanon
Introduction
The prolonged Lebanese Civil War caused the emergence of a considerable
number of rebel groups. Some of them were able to provide services to the
people under their jurisdiction, and others were not competent enough to
maintain governance. Influential rebel groups that had control over strategic
territories, a considerable number of civilian population, and provided public
service were able to ensure their position in the post-conflict process. Hezbollah
was among these groups which were able to prove their leverage (Baylouny
2014, p. 329-353; Harik 1994, p. 1-54).
During the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah was considered as a rebel group that
is consistent with the definition of rebel groups that this study adopts. It is an
armed non-state actor who is representing the Shiite community, which was a
deprived sect. Hezbollah fought different rebel groups during the civil war even
against another Shiite group, which is Amal, and it resisted the Israeli forces as
well. It aimed at changing the social order to have a share in the Lebanese
political order. Due to its continuous resistance to Israel, it might be considered
as a rebel group even after the end of the war especially during the July War in
2006, while it also might be considered as a political party with a military wing.
Therefore, this study will fundamentally verify the hypotheses during the
Lebanese Civil War and illustrate how Hezbollah changed some of its strategies
to sustain its existence even after the end of the war.
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It also provides governance in accordance with the definition of Kasfir (2015).
This definition states that a group needs to control a territory that contains
civilian population and has to be violent whether against other rebel groups, the
incumbent state, or/and the population under its control. For Hezbollah, it
controlled various territories mainly major parts of Bekaa and the South and AlDahyia in Beirut which contain civilian population, and it fought other rebel
groups and the Israeli forces that invaded Lebanon multiple times (Kaskir 2015,
p. 25).
Although state sponsorship is a contributor to the development of rebel
capacities, the management of recourses and innovation of new strategies
depend on the organizational capacity of the rebel group and its decisionmaking process. In the case of Hezbollah, Iran mainly and Syria -before its civil
war- contributed to its establishment and sustainability with financial aid,
training and weaponry. However, Hezbollah’s organizational capacity was a
result of the internal development of tactics and strategies by the party’s cadres
who gained their experience from the dynamics of the Lebanese Civil War and
had more experience in war dynamics than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. From its establishment phase, the founders of Hezbollah wanted to
embed the Shiite Jihadist identity in the group, and they wanted to establish a
group that mainly aims at representing the oppressed Shiite sect in Lebanon and
to resist the Israeli invasion as well. Embedding the identity and satisfying the
people under their control can be considered as the key factor behind their
success. Consequently, while state sponsorship might be helpful for the rebel
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group to sustain its existence, it is not enough by itself to ensure longevity
(DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the internal and external factors that led to
sustainability of Hezbollah. First, the chapter will discuss the formation of
Hezbollah as well as the roots and the dynamics of its evolution. Second, it will
discuss the organizational structure and the hierarchal order, besides specifying
its institutional type in accordance with Mampilly and Stewart (2021)
categorization. Third, it will examine the different strategies that Hezbollah
conducted to gain legitimacy starting from narrative creation to the economic
strategies to questioning the use of violence to the participation in the post-war
political life. Fourth, it will explain the influence of the external support of Iran
especially and Syria as well in the sustainability of Hezbollah. The chapter will
conclude the main factors that lead to the sustainability of Hezbollah even after
the end of the war while reflecting on the hypotheses mentioned in the
theoretical framework.
1- The Formation of Hezbollah:
Hezbollah is considered as an outcome of the evolution of progressive political
mobilization of the Shiites during the sectarian conflict. It was established
predominately by those who separated from Amal movement, as well as other
Shiite groups who emerged to resist Israel. Therefore, it is important to highlight
the emergence of Shiite mobilization during the Lebanese Civil War to
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understand the roots of Hezbollah (DeVore, Stähli and Franke 2019, p. 371400).
Before the civil war, the Shiite community was marginalized, and Shiites could
not develop confessional political parties like other sects. As a result, the
community was vulnerable because such parties were the foundation of the
recognizable militias that initiated the sectarian clashes. Due to that, they had to
ally with the more organized militias that had political wings during the 1950s
such as the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
Afterwards, in late 1960s, a considerable number of Shiites joined the militias
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), because they had dominance
over a large part of Southern Lebanon, which is considered as the heartland of
the Shiites (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
The Shiite mobilization was fostered thanks to Imam Musa Al-Sadr who was
an Iranian-born clergy. He is the founder of the first politico-military Shiite
movement in Lebanon, which is the ‘Movement of the Deprived’ because the
Shiite community was disadvantaged and poor before the war. In mid 1970s, he
established an organised militia ‘Amal’, and sought the help of the PLO to train
Amal due to its military experience. However, it should be noted that coalitions
in the Lebanese Civil War were not permanent. Those Amal militias who fought
alongside the PLO militias against the Maronites fought the PLO for dominance
over the South. Additionally, those who belonged to Amal dissented and fought
against it at later stages (DeVore, Stähli and Franke 2019, p. 371-400).
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This dissidence took place because Nabih Berri, the successor of Imam Musa
Al-Sadr joined the ‘Committee of National Salvation’ to negotiate with Israel.
Therefore, a number of Amal members who were led by Hussein al-Musawi
decided to form ‘Islamic Amal’, which evolved later into Hezbollah. This group
substantially aimed at resisting the Israeli invasion to Lebanon and refused any
negotiations with Israel. Afterwards, a group of pro-Iranian Lebanese clerics
asked Iran for assistance to build a resistance movement against the Israeli
invasion. This movement included dissidents from Amal, Palestinian fighters
and fighters from small Islamist resistance movements. Iran accepted to assist
this group and coordinated with Syria to train and finance this nascent
organization in 1982. In July 1982, Iran sent its Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) to Bekaa Valley to train the fighters and spread news that Iran
became a key player in the Lebanese arena. Although the organization was
under construction, it attracted a large number of former Palestinian and Amal
fighters due to the consistent large salaries that Iran offered. Additionally, some
fighters were sent to Iran and Iraq to continue their training or religious
education there and to ensure their loyalty to Iran (DeVore, Stähli and Franke
2019, p. 371-400).
This Shiite movement started waging attacks against the Israeli forces in
Lebanon, and its militias proved their advancement in combat unlike other
resistance groups that existed at that time. In later stages in the civil war,
Hezbollah did not only fight Israel but also other rebel groups in Lebanon to
gain more territories and impose its leverage. As mentioned before, the enemies
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and allies in the Lebanese Civil War were not constant, therefore, it is difficult
to specify the exact enemies or allies of Hezbollah during that period. Due to
the outstanding skills of Hezbollah in battlefield and organization in the early
stages of its formation, Iran provided it with full support both material and
technical until becoming the instrument to exert its influence in Lebanon, and
the relation between them will be tackled in details in later section (DeVore and
Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
Additionally, the experience of the early founders of Hezbollah -such as alMusawi, al-Khalil, and Mughniyah- contributed to its military advancement.
That is because some of them were high rank officers in Amal and others were
trained by the PLO. Therefore, Hezbollah benefited from their combat tactics
and adjusted them to be suitable to combats against Israel and against other
militias. The military advancement secured and sustained its services network
during the Lebanese Civil War and until now (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331357).
It is not clear when Hezbollah was formed precisely, as the institutional
organization was under construction between 1982 to 1985 when it published
an open letter to announce its formation (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353). The
evolution of constructing the organizational structure of the group will be
discussed in the next section.
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2- The Organizational Structure:
Rebel governance requires institutions to serve the grand agenda and to manage
the daily activities as well. According to Podder (2014), the governance itself is
the set of institutions that the rebels establish to organize the life of the civilian
population in the territory under control (Podder 2014, p.219). These
institutions reflect the organizational capacity of the rebel group and its ability
to sustain governance through maintaining the social order that serves its grand
agenda (Kasfir 2015, p. 28). Therefore, in order to examine the governance
capacity of Hezbollah, this section will discuss its main institutions and examine
the type of its institutions in accordance with the dimensions that Mampilly and
Stewart (2021) discussed, which are; power-sharing, integration, innovation and
inclusiveness.
From the initial stage, the founding clerics of Hezbollah embedded resistance
and jihad as the fundamental ideology of the group, upon which institutions
were built and rooted these values in the minds of its members. Therefore, the
members of the party consider the survival of these institutions as the survival
of their ideology. All the institutions are built to serve the grand strategy of
Hezbollah to embed the resistance ideology throughout the Shiite community
and to attract other sects to support them as well to serve the Iranian foreign
policy eventually. The Grand clerics portrayed resistance as a humanitarian and
religious moral duty and a code of conduct that Shiites need to follow, besides
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convincing them that jihad is not only through military actions but through
maintaining the well-being of the society (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
In 1982, the ‘Shura Council’ was established as the governing body of
Hezbollah to primarily manage the battlefield. The founding clerics pledged
jihad against Israel and acknowledged the political authority of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, which is called in Iran
‘Wilayat al-faqih’ that means the rule of the supreme jurist. In other words, the
group adhered to obey and follow the Iranian Supreme leader, who by this
adherence has the upper hand over the group (Daher 2019, p. 145).
The structure of the Shura Council evolved over time into a complex structure
to correspond to the expansion of Hezbollah. The head of the Council is the
Secretary-General, who supposedly has equal vote to the other members of the
Council. Sometimes, the exact number and names of the Council are not
announced to avoid being targeted. It consists of five main sub-councils, which
are the executive, political, jihad, judicial and parliamentary councils. The
decision-making inside the Council is by majority voting, which is considered
as a democratic decision-making process. An example of a decisive decision
was the vote on participating in the 1992 elections. The Council had to form a
12-member committee to vote, and 10 out of 12 members voted for participation
(Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353; DeVore, Stähli and Franke 2019, p. 371-400;
Harik 2004, p. 54; Ishfaq 2019, p. 1-4; Robinson 2021, para. 3).
The Shura Council was able to develop tactics and strategies during and after
the war to ensure the sustainability of Hezbollah, which will be discussed in the
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legitimacy-building section. The Council delegated some power to field
commanders and directors of the Social Services Central Units. These Units
were established during the civil war are located in each region that Hezbollah
controls, and they are categorised mainly into, those providing economic and
social services such as water and electricity to the population under its rule, and
those deliver services to the military wing of the group. These institutions
possessed a considerable degree of autonomy in decision-making but within the
broader political and ideological agenda of Hezbollah, which is set by the
Council (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
To foster cohesion and limit corruption, all the institutions and commanders are
accountable to the Council. For higher supervision and coordination and to
continue its Jihad quest against Israel after the end of the civil war, the Shura
Council established the Jihad Council to provide tactical guidance to the field
commanders that is headed by the Secretary-General. However, it is thought
that it is currently headed by another leader but that is not announced because
of the fear of being targeted. Generally, there is no available data on the exact
hierarchy and institutions of the military wing of Hezbollah for confidentiality.
The decentralized mode of governance contributed to the improvement of the
tactics and the strategies of Hezbollah because each region had its specialties
and conditions. Therefore, the region leaders had to develop their tactics to cope
with the changing nature of the civil war and report back this experience to the
Shura Council to develop it more and share it with other regions even before

51

the establishment of the Jihad Council during the civil war (Baylouny 2014, p.
329-353; DeVore, Stähli and Franke 2019, p. 371-400).
The organization’s high commander is the Secretary-General, who has to be a
cleric. He should be elected every three years by the Shura Council for two
terms only. However, in 1998, the regulation was changed to unlimited terms
(Daher 2019, p. 130).
Hezbollah’s service institutions operate autonomously, but they coordinate with
each other to provide a holistic service network to deliver services in a more
efficient way than the incumbent central government. They also have a
hierarchy that is strictly respected, and in order to ensure that the directors of
these institutions have enough experience, they are rotated among different
institutions regularly to have knowledge about the whole service chain that
Hezbollah has. Having such knowledge would help them in developing the
party’s capacity and strategies (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
The organizational structure was reconstructed in 1991, which is almost after
the end of the Lebanese Civil War. This was initiated by Secretary-General
Abbas al-Musawi, and after his assassination, his successor ‘Hassan Nasrallah’
followed his steps. Nasrallah justified the reconstruction as important to keep
the organization updated and to utilize the experience of the veterans in
developing tactics and strategies. He emphasised that this would strengthen the
bond between ‘the brothers’ the members of the party. In battlefield, this
reconstruction benefited Hezbollah, and its skills were evolving significantly
against Israel (DeVore, Stähli and Franke 2019, p. 371-400).
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Hezbollah evolved to include more specialized institutions after the civil war.
The Executive Consultative Council is the second authority after the Shura
Council. It consists of the heads of the regions’ leaders and the leaders of the
Central Units that are responsible of services provision. The Politburo, which is
an advisory council that communicates and coordinates the relations with other
actors whether political or independent/civilian actors. Additionally, it prepares
reports upon the request of the Shura Council. The Information Department is
responsible for the multimedia outlets of the party. The Parliamentary Action
Council consists of the former and current MPs that were/are on Hezbollah’s
list in the parliamentary elections even if they are not members in the party.
This council is responsible for arranging and discussing the agenda of
Hezbollah’s MPs (Harik 2004, p. 54; Daher 2019, p. 130- 131).
One of the councils that evolved after the civil war is the Judicial Council.
During the Lebanese Civil War, it was one of the most prominent institutions,
and it was established in each region once Hezbollah consolidated its control. It
consists of courts and councils headed by a judge who is a cleric in most cases,
besides some party members. These councils claimed to rule according to Sharia
‘Islamic Law’. According to Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh who had conducted field
research in Lebanon, these courts sentenced hundreds of people to
imprisonment and death. He also mentioned that when the Lebanese state courts
were reconstructed after the end of the civil war, Hezbollah coordinated with
them and handed them a number of cases. After the end of the war, the Judicial
Council acted as a religious council, which the members of Hezbollah and its
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followers seek to rule over conflicted matters using Sharia (Harik 2004, p. 54;
Daher 2019, p. 130- 131; Hamzeh as cited in Cobban 2005, para. 7).
The party has been organizing a General Congress every three years to evaluate
the work of the Central Units and the other councils and conduct elections to
choose the members of the Shura Council. However, the last congress was held
in 2009, and no justification was announced, but it is claimed that the Syrian
Civil War might be one of the reasons (Daher 2019, p. 132).
After exploring the institutions of Hezbollah, the four dimensions of rebel
institutions of Mampilly and Stewart (2021) can be examined. First, powersharing, which tests whether the group is applying martial law or share a sort of
power with the civilian population. During the civil war, there was no sign that
Hezbollah shared any power with the population under its control, which means
that it was more likely a martial law that was maintained as mentioned before
by Hezbollah’s militias.
Second, integration, the highest level of integration according to Mampilly and
Stewart (2021) is creating parallel civilian councils that function alongside the
rebel’s or collaborating with traditional councils if existed. However, for
Hezbollah, during the civil war, it did not collaborate with traditional notables
who existed in some areas and did not create institutions that were run by
civilians who are not members of Hezbollah. It is important to note that
Hezbollah has political and military wings and some of its members are not
militias but cannot be categorized as civilians because civilians according to this
categorization are those who are not members in the rebel group. However,

54

Hezbollah only recruited civilian population in administrative matters inside its
institutions, which is away from security and existential matters. This is
considered as the minimum level of integration that is used to ensure loyalty.
Third, innovation, which tests whether the rebel group maintained the preexisting institutions or established new ones. For Hezbollah, it had to establish
a new set of institutions to serve its grand agenda, which is considered as the
extreme level of innovation.
Fourth, inclusiveness, which examines the extent to which the rebel group
includes civilian population from different ethnicities, religions and genders to
participate in the institutions and in decisions making. Some rebel groups
involve civilians from the population their control in the decision-making,
however, Hezbollah limits decision-making to the long-standing leaders inside
the party. It is considered as the less inclusive model as it limits the participation
in decision-making to the men Shiite members, and women are only employed
in the unofficial institutions that is affiliated with Hezbollah. The public
interference only occurred through individuals who have contacts inside the
party. Additionally, it ignored the traditional notables who were prominent in
the area that it seized. However, it created units of communication to deal with
the population under its control to ensure that they would not uprise against
them as part of its manipulation or persuasion strategy, which will be discussed
later in this chapter (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353).
To sum up this section, Hezbollah constructed complex state-like institutions;
military, service, political, administrative, and law enforcement institutions. It
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functioned as a state during the war, and even in the post-war period, it
reconstructed its organizational structure to fit in the post-war system. It verifies
the hypothesis that the more the rebel institutions mimic the state institution, the
more the rebel sustain their governance. Additionally, Hezbollah built its
institutions without depending on any pre-existing institutions, it did not share
the authority in its jurisdiction with civilian population during the civil war, and
decision making is limited to the men Shiite members of the party. However, it
created persuasion tactics to manipulate the masses under its judication.
Additionally, it had to collaborate with other parties in local elections after the
war but this is out of the categorisation of Mampilly and Stewart (2021). This
means that it is not necessary to involve the population under its jurisdiction
directly in the decision-making to gain its support and sustain governance, and
there are other strategies that rebels implement to gain legitimacy, which will
be discussed in the next section.
3- Legitimacy-Building:
A rebel group that seeks governance consolidation and expansion needs to adopt
a number of strategies to gain popular legitimacy. However, each rebel group
adopts different strategies than the other, and even the same group may change
its strategies over time and place (Podder 2014, p. 219-221). According to
Arjona (2016), a rebel group would maintain governance and order if it had a
long-term strategy (Arjona 2016, p. 3), and since Hezbollah was initially built
to resist Israel and to be the tool of Iran in Lebanon, it planned its strategies
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accordingly to gain legitimacy from the people to embed its roots. It developed
its strategies since its formation and sustained many of them until the present
time to foster the popular legitimacy that it gained over the years, which will be
examined in this section.
A. Creating A Narrative:
Similar to the state-building process, rebels who seek to possess power and
sustain their existence need to create a solid narrative that creates a connection
between them and the population under their rule, and reflects their agenda. An
identity-based narrative of being a representative of an underrepresented social,
ethnic or religious group is one of the strategies that rebel groups use to attract
popular support and legitimacy. Hezbollah created a solid narrative of being the
representative of the socio-economic deprived Shiite community as well as a
resistance group against the enemy of the nation ‘Israel’. This helped Hezbollah
to gain support especially because the other Shiite militias did not provide the
Shiites with proper services, which will be discussed in details in later section
(Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173).
Additionally, it categorized its followers as “us” and those who are outside the
community as “the other” or “the enemy” (foreign invaders and other rival
militias) to consolidate the sense of belonging to the group. Hezbollah also
propagated itself as the defender of the nation, which allowed it to gain
legitimacy not only from its fellow Shiites but also other Lebanese who refused
the existence of the Israeli forces. States usually use such method to gather their
people around the same identity (Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 285).
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In order to consolidate this narrative, a charismatic leader is needed to rally the
people around the group. Hezbollah’s current Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah is known for his charisma and rhetorical speeches. He usually uses
his words carefully to remind the audience that Hezbollah is the resistance group
that expelled the Israeli armed forces from the country, and it is still resisting
Israel. Additionally, adding words related to supporting the Palestinian freedom
quest (Cobban 2005, para. 2- 6).
Nasrallah is known for his flexibility while addressing different issues. When
he addresses the Shiite, he frames jihad in a religious context and that Israel has
to be expelled from the Muslim lands, besides reminding the masses of
liberating Jerusalem. In his speech in “Ashura”1 in August 2021, he targeted
Shiites and reminded them of the heroism and sacrifices of Al-Abbas who was
one of the leaders in the army of Al-Hussein, and that he has to be their role
model in jihad against the enemies of Lebanon and Islam (Almanar 2021, para.
1).
However, when he speaks in the electoral conferences, he addresses both
Muslims and Christians and emphasizes on Lebanon as a united nation with
common challenges and enemies. For example, in his speech for Bekaa
constituencies before 2022 Parliamentary elections, he reminded them that
Hezbollah defended them from the Israeli attacks while others were allying with

1

It is a festive day for Muslims but Shiites grieve on this day for the death of Al-Hussein, the
grandson of Prophet Mohamed (BBC 2011, para. 1).
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Israel. He asked them “You, people of the Bekaa Muslims and Christians, are
you with those who defend you or with those who conspire against you?”
(Almanar 2022, para.1). He stressed that Hezbollah was fighting terrorism as
well and defended both Christians and Muslims in Bekaa while Christian
political leaders who are against resistance did not think of the Christians and
their security. He said “Are you with the gun that defended the Bekaa or with
the one who provided the gun to the terrorist groups to attack your homes?”
(Almanar 2022, para.1).
Another dimension is the Arab nationalistic perspective, which defends the
Arab nation against the imperial ambitions. In his speech in May 2021 in the
International Day of Jerusalem, he mentioned “the future of the region is shaped
by the axis of resistance” (Almanar 2021, para.1) to remind the Arab that freeing
Palestine is important for the regional security.
Nevertheless, his international speeches focus on delegitimizing the Israeli
occupation of Arab lands and that the jihad/resistance against it is an
internationally recognised right since Israel is violating the UNSC resolutions
(Harik 2004, p. 71-72). He mentioned in his speech in May 2020 “Israel is
illegal and occupier, and there is no legality of its survival” (Almanar 2020,
para.1).
His influence is quite remarkable to the extent that he was ranked among the
100 most influential people in the world by the American magazine ‘Time’ in
2011. For some Lebanese especially the Shiite ones, he is a symbol for
resistance. Additionally, his loyalty and adherence to Iran contributed to
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sustaining his position as the Secretary-General until now. He was an active
member in Hezbollah since the foundation stage, and he was sent to Iran to
continue his education, and some speculations claimed that he was prepared to
be the Secretary-General. Therefore, after the assassination of Abbas AlMusawi, he was elected the Secretary-General despite being 32 years old, which
is relatively young for this position. His strategies in the military field against
Israel and on the political arena contributed to his reputation and popularity as
well (Daher 2019, p. 151-170).
A solid narrative as well needs to be supported by ideological symbolic actions
because hegemony cannot only be gained through coercion. That is because
persuasion and manipulation are highly important to maintain the people’s
support (Mampilly 2015, p. 78). Of the aesthetic symbols is creating channels
of communication and rituals. Hezbollah organized festivals, parades and
commemorations like ‘Ashura’ to consolidate the community solidarity in the
territories under their control (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197; Baylouny
2010, p. 136-149). Hezbollah also established two radio stations during the
Lebanese Civil War ‘the Voice of the Dispossessed’ in the Bekaa and ‘the Voice
of Faith’ in Beirut. These radio stations were stopped and ‘Al-Nur’ station was
established. Additionally, a television channel ‘al-Manar’ was established to
target the international audience as well as the Lebanese. A newspaper ‘Al-Ahd’
was issued and later changed its name to ‘al-Intiquad’ or ‘the Critique’ referring
to being an opposition to the government. In 1990s, the Media Unit was created
to manage the media and communication of the party (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-
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353; Daher 2019, p. 134-135). Hezbollah leaders claim that these channels do
not target the followers of Hezbollah or even Shiites only, but it also targets all
the Lebanese, and they always emphasise that it is the organization’s duty to
help all marginalized people whatever their sect or religion. These rhetoric
slogans are part of the propaganda that Hezbollah uses to gain the support from
the people to promote their agenda during the civil war and until now (Harik
1994, p. 1-54).
One of the rhetoric words that Hezbollah uses frequently to mobilize Shiites is
‘the disempowered’. The victimization notions aimed at showing that the Shiite
was disempowered before Hezbollah, and thanks to it, the Shiite enjoy justice,
solidarity and pride. The rhetoric speeches of Hezbollah’s leaders also extended
to justifying their allegiance to the Iranian Imam who helped in creating wide
coherent Shiite community ‘collective identity’ and efficient governance
capacities because the Iranian Imam protects and maintains the Islamic system
that ensures justice and prosperity (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
One of the symbolic actions also is publicising the idea of heroism and
martyrdom by spreading the photos of martyrs, religious leaders and Palestinian
symbols in the street to deepen the notions of resistance, jihad and sacrifice
among the people and to show them that Hezbollah members are ready to
sacrifice their lives for the nation not only during the civil war but also until
now (Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 285; Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
Through these symbols, Hezbollah managed to gain legitimacy from the
majority of the Shiite community and some non-Shiites as well, especially,
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because it showed the people how much the party is committed to serving them
and adhering to the ideology that it is spreading (Harb and Leenders 2005, p.
197).
However, according to Baylouny (2010), the identity legitimacy is not enough
on its own as it has to be accompanied with providing services and wellconstructed institutions (Baylouny 2010, p. 136-149). Therefore, Hezbollah
diversified its strategies to gain legitimacy through different sources, which will
be discussed in the next section.
B. Economic Strategies:
Delivering services to population under the control of the rebels is a substantial
element of governance as any rebel group that has long-term goals is more likely
to provide services and to act as a parallel government especially in the absence
of central government provision. When a rebel group provides services on a
more regular basis than the incumbent government that is called ‘competitive
governance’, and the probability of accepting and legitimizing this group is
higher (Revkin 2021, p. 47).
When Hezbollah was formed, the Shiite community was underprivileged and
did not have enough access to services. Therefore, Hezbollah realized that in
order to gain the support of a considerable number of Shiite, it had to construct
a services network to serve the population under its jurisdiction after
consolidating its control over territories (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353).
After consolidating its control over some territories, Hezbollah built its own
governance model, which it claimed that it is based on the Islamic Sharia. As a
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response to the inability of the incumbent governments to provide services, it
established a wide social services network with specialized administrative
institutions for governance in Al-Dahyia (suburb in Beirut) and the areas that it
controls in Bekaa and South Lebanon. These institutions are established and
monitored by the Social Services Central Units, and as mentioned before, they
are located in each region that Hezbollah controls to provide services to both
the population under its jurisdiction and to the military wing of Hezbollah
during the civil war and until now (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
Of the category related to civilians matters, the Association of Islamic Religious
Education, which was established during the civil war to help the needy students
and equip the schools that were located under Hezbollah’s control. It also
established the Educational Association of Hezbollah (EAH), which was also
created during the civil war to maintain the bond with the students who were
supported by Hezbollah by providing them with additional religious education
that embeds the Shiite Jihadist ideology of Hezbollah. Later after the end of the
war, the Educational Institute was established to supervise the schools and
educational services that Hezbollah offers and ensures that these services embed
their Shiite resistance ideology in the younger generation. Some other services
that aimed at spreading the ideology of Hezbollah among Shiites are mosques,
theological schools where Khomeini ideology is taught as well as a library that
was established in Hawza al-Ami in Baalbek (Harik 1994, p. 1-54).
Additionally, during the Lebanese Civil War, the Good Loan institution was
established, which is an institution that provides micro-credits with low interest
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rate for Hezbollah followers to help them to start their projects. These loans
ensure the loyalty and attachment of its followers to the party (Harb and
Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
Furthermore, there are four institutions that operate autonomously from the
Social Services Central Units despite being directed by Hezbollah cadres, which
have been functioning from the civil war until now; ‘the Help’ that provides
services to poor people, ‘the Islamic Society for Health’ that runs Hezbollah
hospitals and medical services, the Consultative Centre for Studies and
Documentation (CCSD) which is a research centre that issues reports related to
development. Additionally, the Reconstruction Campaign (RC) ‘Jihad al-Bina’,
which reconstructed homes, roads, schools, and hospitals that were destructed
during the Lebanese Civil War and the wars with Israel mainly in the Shiite
areas under the control of Hezbollah. It is registered in Lebanon as a charitable
organization, and it is mimicking an Iranian organization that was created
during the Iranian revolution. It did not only respond to the war destruction but
also damages from floods like what happened in 1992 in Bekaa Valley.
Additionally, it is responsible of collecting rubbish from Al-Dahiyah since 1988
and fixing any damage in the water and sewage system as well as providing
electricity and water to marginalized areas even after the central government
started providing services to people in Hezbollah’s territories. In some cases,
the central government asks for the help of Hezbollah especially in water
services (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353; Harik 1994, p. 1-54; Harb and Leenders
2005, p. 173-197).
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One of the medical projects that needs to be highlighted is Al-Rasul Al-Aa'zam
Hospital in Beirut that was established during the civil war, and is considered
as one of the most well-equipped hospitals in Lebanon. Substantially, it was
established in order to treat Hezbollah injured fighters so that the party would
be self-sufficient and able to provide the best care to its followers. Until now,
this hospital is operating and serving citizens regardless of their sect (Harik
1994, p. 1-54).
Of the institutions related to the military wing, the Association of the Wounded,
and the Association of the Martyr, which were established during the civil war
and are registered as NGOs. The Association of the Martyr takes care of the
families of the martyrs and missing fighters by providing educational and health
aid as well as other free services in order to make sure that these families stay
under the umbrella of Hezbollah and remain loyal to it (Harb and Leenders
2005, p. 173-197). These institutions do not only aim at helping people, but it
is a dual strategy to symbolize also those who sacrifice their lives as mentioned
before in the chapter. It is evident as well that the service institutions are linked
to the military wing because Hezbollah’s militias are responsible of ensuring
the implementation of the projects conducted by the service institutions, in other
words, Hezbollah’s political and military wings work hand in hand to ensure
the sustainability of its grand policies. This welfare system has two aims as well,
first, to show their followers that the party is willing to take care of them in case
they were injured as there are well-equipped hospitals that are prepared to treat
them and their families and in case they died, the party would look after their
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families. This system provides special aid for the education and the health care
of the martyrs’ families. Secondly, Hezbollah did not only ensure the loyalty of
their existing soldiers but also encourage their kin to follow their path and join
the party. That also contributed to fostering professionalism and self-sacrifice
(DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357; Harik 1994, p. 1-54).
In order to finance all these projects, Hezbollah received financial assistance
from Iran, which will be discussed in later section, additionally, it was able to
generate funds from other sources during the civil war and until now. Since
Hezbollah cannot be considered as a looting rebel group, it depends on other
sources for funding. Besides Iran, Hezbollah generated funds through illegal
drug trafficking of drugs and kidnapping as well. It depended as well on the
labour remittances from its followers who are working abroad and also issued
unique type of taxes based on their interpretation of Islam called ‘the khums’,
which was applied on all its populace. Additionally, it controlled some ports
and checkpoints (Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353).
One of the main sources of funding that Hezbollah relied on was kidnapping.
However, kidnapping was a tool for Hezbollah to exert pressure and denounce
the Western intervention in Lebanon. The leaders of Hezbollah thought that
kidnapping would be an effective way to show the Western military forces that
it had tactical strategies. As a result, many European and American personnel
and civilians left Lebanon because of the fear of abduction, and this limited the
ability of their countries to influence certain events inside Lebanon during the
civil war. In addition, Hezbollah alongside with its ally Iran used these hostages
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to force the United States and European countries to liberate imprisoned
terrorists, paying ransoms, deport Iranian oppositions that are refugees in the
United States and Europe, and secretly selling Iranian weaponry. For example,
in 1987, the United States prohibited American citizens from travelling to
Lebanon, and the most prominent case took place when Regan Administration
secretly agreed on a weapon bargain with Iran. It is obvious that Iran was
benefiting more than Hezbollah from these abductions, but Hezbollah
developed tactics and strategies to conduct them, which benefited its
organizational development and proved its leverage in Lebanon, which also
contributed to its sustainability (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
Even after the war, Hezbollah continues its governance activities, especially
water and electricity services. Additionally, it offered a free transportation
system that linked Baalbek to outlying towns besides opening restaurant,
clinics, supermarkets and pharmacies that provide free services for poor people.
The continuation of providing services even after the war was a strategy to keep
Shiites in their areas loyal to Hezbollah and to encourage other Shiite to join the
party, and through this, the party can continue its resistance against Israel as
well as maintaining its leverage over these areas (Harik 1994, p. 1-54).
This continuation is a result of the weakness of the state institutions to function
and provide the people all over Lebanon with basic services. However,
substantially, it reflects that the government is not intending to encounter
Hezbollah because of Hezbollah’s great influence on the Shiites in Hezbollah’s
regions of influence and the inability of the government to deliver services
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instead of Hezbollah. According to Harik (2004), Hezbollah leaders are aware
that people would revolt against the government if Hezbollah was hindered
from delivering services to people, therefore, from their perspective they are
helping the government and preventing social disorder (Baylouny 2014, p. 329353; Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197; Harik 2004, p. 85).
Hezbollah justifies the provision of its service system that it is an Islamic duty
to serve mankind whether those who receive the services are Muslims or not.
However, the untold reality is that the party aims at emphasising its hegemony
by providing services that the state is unable to provide (Harik 1994, p. 1-54).
Some field researchers like Harik and Hamzeh reported that Hezbollah’s
services were provided to all the people under its jurisdiction even if they were
not Shiite, and that some Christians preferred to send their children to schools
which were established and run by Hezbollah particularly in South Lebanon
because it was providing the highest quality of education available (Hamzeh as
cited in Cobban 2005, para. 7; Harik 2004, p. 73). This is called a pragmatic
strategy that aims at delivering services to people regardless of their sect as well
as imposing the rule of law, which helped in fostering relation with non-Shiite
and Hezbollah’s legitimacy as well (Terpstra 2020, p.1145).
To sum up, according to Cunningham and Loyle (2020), rebels gain legitimacy
if the rebel group provides services to people who were neglected by the
incumbent government and providing them in a more sustainable way
(Cunningham and Loyle 2020, p. 8). Therefore, since the provision of all these
services was unfamiliar for the Shiite community as they were marginalized by
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pre-war governments, and other Shiite militias did not provide them with such
welfare service network, the Shiite civilian population who were under the
jurisdiction of Hezbollah dealt with it as the legitimate ruler (Kingston and
Zahar 2004, p. 81-98). In the next section, the relation with the population under
its control will be examined by questioning Hezbollah’s use of violence.
C. Violence Reconsidered:
Political actors who seek to establish a social order needs to use violence to
consolidate their rule. However, it is always questionable; violence against
whom and why. Therefore, these actors need to justify their use of violence,
avoid extensive and indiscriminate use of violence, and rely on both coercion
and persuasion with materialistic and ideological tools to sustain their existence
(Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p.279).
For Hezbollah, there is contradictory information about its relations with the
population under its control especially those who are from different sects and
religions as some reports gave positive feedbacks and others not because it is
difficult to study public opinion systematically in an academic way during war
or instability. However, in this section, both the positive and negative reviews
will be discussed.
During the early phases of the Lebanese Civil War, Beirut was divided into two
camps and many Christians had to leave Al-Dahyia and thousands of refuge
Shiites settled there, which later became the headquarter of Hezbollah in Beirut.
Therefore, there was a limited number of Christians under the jurisdiction of
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Hezbollah, and it is difficult to track how Hezbollah dealt with those minority
(Fawaz 2007, p. 22-23).
Regarding Sunnis, there are not enough data if there were any clashes between
Hezbollah and the Sunni population during the civil war, so it is difficult to
evaluate their relationship.
Hezbollah mixed between coercion strategies and persuasion ones in order to
maintain its relations with the population under its jurisdiction. Therefore, in
order to limit the clashes between the fighters and the civilian population,
Hezbollah provided its fighters with higher payments compared to other rebel
groups in Lebanon, so the fighters were less prone to attack the civilian
population for money. Additionally, during the civil war, units were established
to monitor the actions of the fighters to make sure that the general rules are
obeyed. In case clashes took place between its militias and other communal
leaders, Hezbollah leaders would interfere to settle them to maintain social
order. Furthermore, Hezbollah established a judicial system during the civil war
to maintain the social order inside the territories under its jurisdiction. Through
this system, it tried criminals, mediated between parties in clash, and in some
cases, it paid reconciliation to prevent further escalation. Hezbollah used force
to restore order in case peaceful mediation failed. The justification of the use of
force is that it is important to maintain the internal security of its territories to
focus its power on resisting the Israeli aggression and the other clashes with
rival militias. The known violent actions of Hezbollah were against rival rebel
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groups during the civil war and Israel until the present time (Baylouny 2010, p.
136-149; Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353).
In turn, this gave Hezbollah legitimacy of use of force because it is fighting the
foreign invader, and it always uses the ideological cause and being the protector
of Islam and Lebanon to publicise itself and justify its aggressive actions. This
strategy is called the moral strategy, which is fostered by external intervention
because the people are more likely to support a group that is defending the
country from foreign invasion (Terpstra 2020, p.1145).
This moral strategy did not only affect Shiite, according to Helena Cobban
(2005), during the Israeli invasion in 1980s, some middle-class Christian
women donated their jewellery to the emergency donation boxes of Hezbollah.
It is believed that such act was conducted because some non-Shiite Lebanese
perceived Hezbollah as a patriot resistance group, so that is why these people
accepted and supported Hezbollah. Additionally, Hezbollah earned more trust
because of its progress against the Israeli attacks (Cobban 2005, para. 3).
However, it should be noted that not all civilian residents in Al-Dahyia
welcomed Hezbollah. According to Mona Harb, a considerable number of the
opponents left Al-Dahyia to other areas. The others who stayed tried not to clash
with Hezbollah’s forces and even those who attempted to show their opposition
were in a peaceful way. Until now, Al-Dahyia is considered as Hezbollah’s
territory (Harb 2007, para. 2-4).
Of the persuasion strategies as well is the less formal channels that was used to
embed Hezbollah’s Shiite ideology through women and local clerics who
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spread their ideology among kinships and families. These informal networks
communicated with the population under its control to gather opinions about
Hezbollah’s administration and then report back to the Shura Council.
Hezbollah’s leaders claim that this method is called participatory methodology
which involves the people in the decision-making process to maximise the
efficiency of its institutions. In reality, these networks were used to manipulate
the masses that their voices are heard (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
Coming to the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah continued its
persuasion strategy and realized that it has to attract more non-Shiite to support
them to be able to enter the political life after the war. Therefore, it reconstructed
its institutions and changed its political dialogue to appear more inclusive
(Cobban 2005, para. 2). This will be discussed in details in the next section.
D. Participation in the Post-Conflict Political Life:
The Lebanese political leaders have created and maintained clientelist networks
through which their constituencies highly depend on them as they supply them
with services persistently instead of the incapable official state institutions.
Through this network, they gained legitimacy from the people that they serve.
This patron-client relationship is not an invention of war, but it has existed even
before the Lebanese Civil War. After the war, some of these political leaders
controlled state institutions, which they use to serve their own interests.
Additionally, in order to maintain their legitimate existence and foster their
sectarian position, they participate in elections to make sure that they have a say
in the government (Geha 2019, p. 125-140).
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Therefore, in order for Hezbollah to engage in the political life after war, it
realised that it had to reconstruct its political wing to participate in the
Parliamentary Elections in 1992 to be part of the decision-making on district
level as well as the state level through its representatives in the parliament. Most
importantly, it had to give up its Islamic Fundamentalist beliefs and only be
framed as a national resistance group that defends the homeland against the
enemy ‘Israel’. The former Secretary-General Abbas Musawi initiated this
reformation plan; however, he was assassinated by Israel, and Nasrallah
followed his path. (Harik 1994, p. 1-54; Cobban 2005, para. 2).
However, the decision to participate in the 1992 elections was a result of a clash
inside the Shura Council on whether to participate or not. The side that rejected
the participation justified that the participation would undermine the resistance
revolutionary thoughts that Hezbollah was built upon. However, the proelection side argued that the party has to cope with the changing Lebanese
political life, and this participation would allow the party to influence from
within the system. The council finally decided to participate (Harb and Leenders
2005, p. 173-197). In order to attract civilians both Shiites and non-Shiites to
vote for them, the Politburo became responsible for creating dialogues with the
non-Shiite Lebanese, and Hezbollah high clerics always try to convince nonShiites through speeches and talks on the party’s television and radio channels
and publicising that a dialogue with Christians should be conducted without
enforcing its belief on them. The party also organised ‘get to know us’ meetings
in which non-Shiite youth were invited to boost the relationship between the
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party and the Lebanese youth. In addition, the collaboration of Hezbollah with
Christian parties in some elections motivates some Christians to vote for
Hezbollah in municipalities where both sects exist and support its resistance
actions (Harik 2004, p. 73-75).
Additionally, when Hezbollah got integrated in the post-war political life in the
first elections in 1992, some secular Shiites were selected to be members of the
Shura Council to give an impression to the Lebanese that the party was
reconstructed and has a political wing that would be part of the democratic
political life (Cobban 2005, para. 2).
Before 1992 parliamentary election, Judith Harik conducted a survey on 1,427
individuals in Lebanon on whether or not they are willing to vote for a resistance
group in the elections, and the results revealed that 62 percent would do. This
survey included both Christians and Muslims ‘Shiites and Sunnis’, which means
that by that time, Hezbollah earned respect and credibility from the people as a
national resistance group which can be part of the state decision-making
dynamics not only war (Harik 2004, p. 50).
As a result of its legitimacy-gaining strategies from its establishment and the
continuation after the end of the war, it won 8 seats out of 128 in that round,
making it the largest single party bloc of this parliament. It gained its legitimacy
as a mainstream party that had a national resistance wing. Since then, Hezbollah
has been participating in all the elections on the municipal and parliamentary
level and gaining significant numbers of seats. Because of its number of seats
in the parliament, it has the right to participate in the government and to confirm
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the government formation, which means that it is involved directly in the
decision-making of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah is considered as a unique case
where a rebel group that is not demilitarized is a part of an internationally
recognized central government (Harb and Leenders 2005, p. 173-197).
In 1998 municipal elections, Hezbollah did not hesitate to ally with other sects,
which it fought before. According to Cobban (2005), who conducted interviews
with Hezbollah leaders, they claimed that the top priority of Hezbollah is to
provide good governance to all Lebanese even if it has to form alliances with
former enemies. The justification for that is that religiously the collective good
of people is a priority (Cobban 2005, para. 2). However, it is substantial to note
that forming such alliances is part of the political Lebanese dynamics, and it is
not limited to Hezbollah. Additionally, it added figures who had been working
in its services sector on its list to be familiar to the people. It also had to ally not
only with political parties that were former enemies but also with some wellknown families that have influence on the municipal level and added their
prominent figures to its list to secure more votes from the people that are loyal
to these families (Harik 2004, p. 76- 103; Cobban 2005, para. 2).
Besides elections, Hezbollah has an extensive influence over Al-Dahyah’s
Shiites to the extent that it mobilised them for protests and strikes against the
government. It also formed groups such as ‘the Dahiyah Activists and Residents
Committee’ to exert pressure on the government to take actions that serve the
interest of Hezbollah such as using only Muslim engineers to reconstruct the
area since the majority of the residents are Muslims. By such acts, the party
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wanted to show its leverage and how it can affect the decision making (Harik
1994, p. 1-54). Furthermore, Hezbollah has different units that are established
to mobilize different categories of the society such as the Women’s Committees
Unit and Mobilization Unit for Education, these units organize conferences and
demonstrations in some cases to oppose the government policies when they
contradict with Hezbollah’s agenda (Daher 2019, p. 132-134).
Although Hezbollah preserved almost same seats in the parliament every year,
a poll was conducted by Pew Research Centre in 2010. It stated that 40% of
Lebanese had a favourable view of Hezbollah, however, this support is
particularly from the Shiite Lebanese as 94% of Shiite supported it, while only
12% of Sunnis and 20% of Christians supported it (Pew Research Centre 2010,
para. 1-2). This percentage was almost stable until 2014, as 41% of Lebanese
supported the existence of Hezbollah including 86% of Shiite, while 12% of
Sunnis and 31% of Christians favoured its existence (Pew Research Centre
2014, para. 6). According to these percentages, the Shiite percentage declined
while Christians increased. It was claimed that the decline of the Shiite support
was due to the participation of Hezbollah in the Syrian Civil War in 2013, which
might affect Hezbollah’s concentration on the domestic Lebanese interest
(Robinson 2021, para. 6). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these surveys
are not accurate to a considerable extent because the critical sectarian
environment in Lebanon hinders conducting academic surveys.
In the 2018 election, Hezbollah did not lose any of its seats from its previous
elections, which means that it sustained its Shiite support. That is because they
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believe the claim of Hezbollah that the intervention in Syria was pre-emptive to
protect Lebanon from the radical Islamists, and that Hezbollah intervened to
protect the Shiite Legacy and the Holly places that were attacked in Syrian
(BBC, 2018, para. 1; Tokmajyan 2014, p. 108). On the other hand, Hezbollah
was backed by the Maronite Party ‘the Free Patriotic Movement’ when it
intervened in the Syrian Civil War, and a considerable number of Christians
supported Hezbollah as well especially because Hezbollah was encountering
the extremists in Lebanon and defending the nation from their perspective
(Kverme 2013, para. 1).
It was argued that the popularity of Hezbollah among the Shiite was slightly
affected due to the corruption proliferated in Lebanon especially when it
reached those who have ties and affiliation with Hezbollah and inside the party
as well, besides, the inability of the cabinet members who have affiliation to
Hezbollah to improve the government service sector and other economic
sectors. (Lob 2014, p.1-7; Dingel 2013, p. 70-76). In 2020, a survey was
published by the Washington Institute showed that there is a slight decline in
the Shiite support to Hezbollah from 83% in 2017 to 66% of very positive views
in 2020 with the rise of anti-corruption demonstrations in Lebanon as well as
the explosion of Beirut port with accusations levelled against Hezbollah of
storing explosive material in the civilian port (Pollock 2020, para. 3). Again, it
is important to note that such polls cannot be analysed in an academic way since
they do not share how they collect data and other information about the age, the
region and other criteria upon which the sample was selected, and all of these
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are important factors for analysis. Therefore, it might be considered as a
Western political biased perspective. Additionally, it should be noted that
Hezbollah still has a wide Shiite support, and a considerable number of its
followers can hardly change their affiliation as they highly depend on Hezbollah
on daily basis.
The 2022 elections can be considered as an evidence to the consolidation of
Hezbollah wide support among Shiites as it won 15 seats in the Parliament, and
alongside its Shiite ally Amal, they won the majority, despite the hopes that this
can change after the demonstrations in October 2019 (Annahar 2022, para. 20).
This means that Hezbollah until now has a considerable influence on the state
decision-making and no government is formed unless it verifies its members
because it has a considerable number of seats in the parliament. There are
several reasons behind wining these seats, substantially, Hezbollah has been
framed as a national resistance group against the enemy ‘Israel’, and it still
provides services persistently to the people under its jurisdiction (Harik 2004,
p. 51).
Through all the above-mentioned factors and strategies, Hezbollah managed to
gain legitimacy through which it sustained its existence until the present time.
However, besides well-constructed institutions and legitimacy-building
strategies, there is also the external support that Hezbollah receives in a
consistent basis that was a substantial factor as well in prolonging and rooting
its leverage in Lebanon. That will be discussed in the next section.
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4- External Support:
According to Daniel Byman and Bruce Hoffman, state sponsorship provides
various forms of assistance to the rebel group such as; financial and material
aid, organizational support, refuge, and political support. For Hezbollah, its
relationship with Iran is ideological in essence, because the founding clerics of
Hezbollah are students of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini even before he became
the Supreme Leader of Iran. As mentioned previously, they acknowledged his
political authority while founding the organization (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p.
331-357).
Additionally, Iran supports Hezbollah financially, and this consistent financial
support is an important factor of sustainability for Hezbollah especially because
of the lack of natural resources that can be looted in Lebanon. In addition, taxing
the population under its jurisdiction would not be enough for the developmental,
service and military projects that Hezbollah initiates. Furthermore, in order for
a rebel group to sustain its militant actions, it needs loyal personnel, and they
will not remain loyal unless they believe in the cause of the group and receive
regular salaries as well. Hezbollah would not be able to pay these regular
salaries unless Iran gives it financial assistance especially at the foundation
stage. Additionally, this helps in recruiting more people, because during the
time of war some people ‘breadwinners’ would be attracted to work for rebel
groups to gain money due to the deteriorated economic system and the lack of
job opportunities. This financial assistance helped Hezbollah in establishing its
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wide welfare network, which is beneficial not only for its followers but also for
the population under its jurisdiction who may not be Shiites. Until the end of
the war, Iran granted Hezbollah around $100 million annually (DeVore and
Stähli 2015, p. 331-357; Baylouny 2014, p. 329-353).
Iran did not only provide Hezbollah with money as it also secures a safe haven
for Hezbollah not only in Iran but also in Syria by negotiating with Hafez AlAssad, the former President of Syria to allow them to stay in Syria which is
nearer to Lebanon (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
Additionally, in order to pave the way for Hezbollah and to prove its leverage
on the Lebanese soil, in 1982, charitable organizations were established by
Iranians such as Imam Khomeini Assistance Committee, which provided
educational assistance and financial loans in Beirut (Harik 1994, p. 1-54). At
the early foundation stage, Iran sent experts from the IRGC to train Hezbollah’s
soldiers. However, their strategies were incompatible with the arena of the
Lebanese Civil War, and after a period of time, the cadres of Hezbollah replaced
them. In the military sphere, the militias of Hezbollah are considered to be more
competent than the IRGC, and they do not only conduct training in Lebanon but
also in Iran (DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331-357).
From the Iranian side, the formation of Hezbollah was a foreign policy tool as
it uses the militias of Hezbollah to fight Israel indirectly in a ‘proxy war’, and
this gave the chance for Iran to have influence and active say in the Middle East
war and peace dynamics. From an ideological perspective, the empowerment of
Shiite in Lebanon served the geopolitical ambitions of Iran (Harik 2004, p. 40).
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The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is considered to be a long-term
stable relation unlike the relation between Hezbollah and its second state
sponsor Syria. Their relation was not always harmonious. Although both of
them allied on the same cause to fight against Israel, Hafeez Al-Assad regarded
Hezbollah as a rebel group which is hard to control and its leverage in Lebanon
could be an obstacle on his attempts to extend his hands over the country.
However, only with the persuasion of Iran, he allowed Iran to transport its
material assistance to Hezbollah through Syria in exchange with free oil
bargain. Nevertheless, Iran mediation did not prevent the constant clashes
between the militias of Hezbollah and the Syrian army between 1987-1990.
Additionally, one of the issues between Hezbollah and Syria was due to the
kidnappings that Hezbollah conducted in the influence area of Syria where it
deployed its forces because Syria was blamed by the Western powers that it was
unable to maintain security in these areas. Later, when Hezbollah proved its
efficiency in fighting Israel, Syria noticed that it could use it as a tool to exert
its strategy in Lebanon (Harik 2004, p. 37; DeVore and Stähli 2015, p. 331357).
The relation between Hezbollah and Syria became more stable after signing the
National Reconciliation Accord, which is known as “Taif Accord”. This postwar accord consolidated and legalised the Syrian existence in Lebanon as it
granted Syria the authority to disarm all the Lebanese militias and be
responsible of the Lebanese security until the reconstruction of the Lebanese
national army within a two-year timetable. Al-Assad seized this Accord to tight
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his grip over Lebanon and empower Hezbollah to ensure that it will continue its
resistance against Israel even if the Syrian army withdrew from the Lebanese
territory (Harik 2004, p. 45-46).
After the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanon, Bashar Al-Assad
depended on Hezbollah to be his hands in Lebanon. However, the Syrian
support to Hezbollah was reversed when the Syrian Civil War erupted and AlAssad regime sought the support of Hezbollah against its opponents (Robinson
2021, para. 6).
To sum up this section, Hezbollah’s external support especially from Iran is one
of the key factors that contribute to the sustainability of the party not only until
the end of the civil war but also until now. Their relation is based on sharing the
same ideology of being Shiite and resisting Israel and that is why they are still
connected to each other.
Conclusion:
Hezbollah is a unique case study which verifies the hypotheses of sustainability
set out in the theoretical framework. First, the founders and leaders of Hezbollah
established a well institutionalised organizational structure that embeds the
grand ideology of Hezbollah in the minds of its followers to ensure their loyalty.
Additionally, it has checks and balances system to monitor how these
institutions function to limit corruption. It has specialized institution for
different services, political matters and military aspects and a well-constructed
hierarchy that has to be followed. Its state-like institutions verify H13 ‘the more
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the rebel institutions mimic the state institutions, the more the rebel group
sustains its governance’.
Second, Hezbollah was able from the initial phase until the present time to build
and maintain its legitimacy especially among the Shiite constituencies and
verifies H1 ‘a rebel group that could not gain minimal legitimacy is less likely
to sustain its governance’. It created a narrative of being the representative of
the deprived Shiite in Lebanon verifying H3 ‘a rebel group that has an identity
similar to the population under its jurisdiction is more likely to gain more
legitimacy’. With fighting the Israeli forces in Lebanon, it verifies both H4
‘rebel groups that are showing themselves as the defenders of the nation are
more likely to gain more legitimacy’ and H12 ‘rebels who create a common
foreign enemy are more likely to gain internal legitimacy’, especially that it
gained support even from non-Shiite Lebanese due to that. To propagate and
consolidate these narratives, Hezbollah is currently led by Hassan Nasrallah
who is considered as an influential and charismatic leader, which verifies as
well H5 ‘rebel group that has a charismatic leader is more likely to sustain its
governance’. Hezbollah also created a number of symbolic actions such as
parades, religious festivals, television and radio channels, speeches, and
spreading photos of martyrs, religious leaders and Palestinian symbols, which
all verify H6 ‘a rebel group that is able to create a solid narrative supported with
symbolic actions is more likely to gain legitimacy and sustain its governance’.
However, the narrative by itself is not sufficient to sustain governance because
the people substantially care about having their daily needs in a consistent way.
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Hezbollah managed to deliver services; educational, health, food, water,
financial assistance, and above all defended the people under its jurisdiction
from both other rival militias and the Israeli forces. This service provision is
still continuing until the present time despite the existence of a central
government, however, many of these governments were not able to provide
services to all areas in Lebanon in a consistent way comparable to Hezbollah.
Therefore, this proves H7 ‘rebel groups who are willing to provide the people
under their jurisdiction with consistent goods and services are more likely to
gain legitimacy’. It is substantial to note that Hezbollah’s financial capacity is
dependent on the support of Iran, which sponsors Hezbollah finically and
technically as well due to their ideological ties, which confirms H8 ‘rebels who
receive consistent external financial assistance are more likely to sustain their
governance’.
Hezbollah’s violence actions against the population under its rule are difficult
to track due to the limited and contradictory data especially that collecting data
during a civil war is challenging. However, based on the available data
Hezbollah did not conduct extensive violence against the population under its
control, and it used a number of strategies to persuade them that it is the
legitimate ruler as mentioned before in the chapter, which proves H9 ‘rebels
who use a mix of coercion and persuasion are more likely to sustain their
governance’.
Hezbollah even survived after the end of the civil war due to its flexibility to
change its slogans and speeches to be more inclusive and not limited to the
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Shiites by portraying itself as a resistance group that is defending the nation
against the common enemy Israel. Additionally, it announced that it does not
target any different ideology inside Lebanon and the importance of living in
harmony for the sake of the nation. It even allied in many elections with
different parties that were former enemies during the war and this proves H2 ‘a
rebel group that cannot negotiate with its allies and enemies is less likely to
sustain its governance’.
Hezbollah is considered as one of the unique rebel groups that not only survived
until the end of the war but also participated in the post-war political life and
preserving a large number of seats in every parliament since the end of the war
and exists in the government while still being the only militarized party in
Lebanon. It is not predicted that Hezbollah will be weakened or undermined in
the near future because of the strategies and factors that were mentioned in this
chapter and importantly the Shiite support that it preserves until now.
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Chapter Four: The Governance of the Democratic Union Party in Syria
Introduction:
With the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the central government lost its
control over several parts of the country, besides losing its capacity to govern
them. These parts were governed by non-state actors who were not
internationally recognized as the legal sovereign authority (Ali 2015, p. 2).
Several non-state actors arose throughout the war, nevertheless, this study will
only focus on the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which can be considered as
an ethnically-driven rebel group that is consistent with the definition of the rebel
group that this study adopts. It was able to sustain its rule for a considerable
amount of time, deliver governance in the middle of the war, communicate with
international actors, and create state-like institutions. The PYD fulfilled the
main three elements of rebel governance that Kasfir (2015) identified, which
are the territory as it has under its control the ‘Rojava’ region that contains
civilian population, besides using violence against any group that tried to attack
its territory. One the other hand, the PYD governance performance will be
examined in this study due to the reported violations against the population
under its jurisdiction as well as the deterioration of governance provision in the
regions under its control.
In order to examine the governance performance of the PYD, there are several
dynamics that need to be considered. The identity factor is essential since the
PYD is a Kurdish political movement. However, it should be noted that the
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Syrian Kurds had always been less active than the Kurds in other states, and
have been influenced by other Kurdish political movements especially the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. Even after the establishment of the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) in 2003, their political activities were kept to
the minimal and their leader and militias were in other countries to avoid any
clash with the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil
War, the PYD seized the moment to consolidate its position in the political life
of the country (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 1).
Another factor is the alliance and affiliations with other Kurdish movements
inside and outside Syria. The PYD did not want to share its power with other
Kurdish political groups in Syria as it sought to monopolize the authority over
the regions that were later called ‘Rojava’. It was reported that the PYD has
been supressing the Kurdish political groups, which oppose its governance.
Additionally, it has a questionable relationship with the PKK that is designated
as a terrorist group by the United States, Turkey and other states. Although the
PYD denies being sponsored by the PKK, which is considered as the founder
of the PYD and its main supporter (Kajjo 2020, p. 2).
Furthermore, the dynamics of the Syrian Civil War need to be considered to
determine the PYD position in such a complex environment. Therefore, first,
the study will start by discussing a brief history about the outbreak of the Syrian
Civil War, the Syrian Kurds, and how the PYD emerged. Second, the study will
examine the organizational structure of the PYD, besides specifying its
institutional type in accordance with Mampilly and Stewart (2021)

87

categorization. Third, it will examine the different strategies that PYD
conducted to gain legitimacy starting from creating a narrative to the economic
strategies to questioning the use of violence. Fourth, it will question the
influence of the external support from different actors such as the PKK and the
United States at some point. Finally, the study will question whether the PYD
will sustain its existence after the reconciliation with the Syrian regime or its
activities will deteriorate.
1- Historical Background:
This section will discuss the emergence and evolution of the Syrian Civil War
and highlight how the rebel groups started to emerge. Then, it will introduce a
brief history about the Kurds in Syria and how they were marginalized for many
years. Afterwards, it will examine the establishment and development of the
PYD.
A. From Peaceful Protests to Civil War:
In early 2011, with the outbreak of demonstrations in a number of Arab
countries, mass civilian protests arose in Syria demanding socio-political
reforms and the overthrow of the coercive authoritarian regime of Bashar AlAssad. However, the peaceful protests did not last because of the brutal reaction
of Al-Assad regime that included arbitrary detention and target killing. This led
to the rise of armed opposition groups, which started with the formation of the
Free Syrian Army, and later other groups with different ideologies were formed.
Due to the opposition’s fragmentation, lack of coordination, and even militant
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clashes against each other, the conflict prolonged and Al-Assad remained. By
mid 2012, the scale of the conflict has expanded to a civil war (Berti 2020, p. 4;
Aljundi et al. 2014, p. 13; Abboud 2016, p. 58-61).
The civil war and state failure in Syria were simultaneous or what Hinnebusch
(2018) called “double state failure”, which means that the state failed on the
material level and lost its monopoly over the use of force and its sovereignty
over all or parts of its territory. However, on the ideational level, the state no
longer has a solid narrative, and each sect established rival narrative against the
other. With the outbreak of the war, local-based armed groups were formed
based on identity, and civilians began to depend on and trust the groups that
share similar identity with them. Additionally, sectarian demonizing arose and
different sects became unable to coexist together safely, especially with the
spread of hatred by the identity-based military groups against each other
(Hinnebusch 2018, p. 397).
With the upsurge of violence and armed rebels, the ability of the Syrian
government to deliver services and security to areas that were not under its
control declined severely, and this gap was not filled by alternative coherent
non-state institutions immediately. Governance instead was delivered on the
local level whether by local councils who have affiliation to rebel groups to fund
them, help in law enforcement, and provide security, or in other cases, the rebels
governed by themselves with their own institutions (Aljundi et al. 2014, p. 1622; Abboud 2016, p. 68; Hinnebusch 2018, p. 397).
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The unstable environment led to the rise and fall of a considerable number of
rebel groups in Syria. However, the state institutions did not vanish in war but
their power was limited to the areas under the control of the regime, and a
number of state institutions operated in rebel-held territories to issue personal
status documents like marriage and death certificates. In some cases, the state
negotiated with rebels on the national scarce resources and delivered electricity
or water to areas under the control of rebels as well. This could be considered
as a tactic to show to civilian population that the state is still able to deliver
services to them to regain their support. The state even deprived a number of
areas that were loyal to rebels from accessing services and humanitarian
assistance and rewarded those who showed resistance against rebels (Berti
2020, p. 5-6; Abboud 2016, p. 72).
Few of these rebel administrations and local councils survived due to a number
of reasons. In some cases, they suffered from the lack of coordination and
fragmentation among the identity-based groups, which weakened them. In
addition, the decline of the national production and the dependence on external
flow of resources such as humanitarian aid and sponsor funding weakened a
number of rebel groups. That is because some sponsors limited the flow of funds
because they lost interest in the war in Syria. However, some rebel groups
especially the jihadist ones such as ISIS were able to seize control over natural
resources such as oil, which secured them a more sustainable source of funding.
Additionally, and substantially, the Russian interference to support the Syrian
regime eliminated a considerable number of them and regained the territories
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under their control for the regime. In other words, the conflict dynamics were
influenced not only by internal factors but also by external ones because of the
excessive foreign interference in Syria from a number of countries that support
different players. Syria became a proxy war arena in which some countries
admit their existence on ground and others not. Some support the Syrian regime
such as Russia and Iran, and on the other side, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emiratis and Qatar supported different rival rebel groups, which complicated
the situation more. This rivalry caused more fragmentation in governance and
the failure to sustain governance (Berti 2020, p. 5-7; Hinnebusch 2018, p. 398).
Despite the spread of chaos and fragmentation in Syria, the PYD was to a
considerable extent able to provide quasi-governance in its territories for a
considerable amount of time (Hinnebusch 2018, p. 403). In order to understand
the environment in which the PYD emerged, a brief history of the Kurds in Syria
will be highlighted in the next section.
B. The Marginalization of the Syrian Kurds:
Syria is known for its heterogenous demography with different ethnicities,
religions and sects. The majority of the population is Arab Muslim Sunni with
a considerable number of minority groups such as Allawites, Kurds, Druze,
Christians and others. However, the political power lies in the hands of the
Allawite minority as the president is from Al-Assad family and the security
apparatus is controlled by Allawites as well, while selecting some elites from
the other sects to work in the government. Hafez Al-Assad regime was known
for his suppressive brutal actions against the opposition, which included the
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massacre of Hama. Bashar Al-Assad followed his father’s steps and used the
same oppressive tools, which were evident since the beginning of the uprising
in 2011 (International Crisis Group 2011, p. 1-10).
Regarding the Kurds who are the focus of this study, they are considered as the
largest minority with around 10% of the population. They mainly reside in
northern Syria along the borders with Turkey and Iraq, specifically in Ain alArab, northeast in the Jazira region, and northwest in Afrin region, besides
Aleppo and Damascus where a considerable number of them live there. It
should be noted that there are other ethnicities who live in the Kurdish-majority
regions such as Syriacs, Armenians, Arabs and Turkmen (Human Rights Watch
2014, para. 4).
The Syrian Kurds have been suffering from persecution for decades even before
Al-Assad family as the Syrian authorities banned the use of the Kurdish
language, feasts and publications. Additionally, by 1962, hundreds of thousands
of Kurds were denationalised and displaced from their land to resettle Syrian
Arabs instead of them in the lands between the Kurds in Syria and Turkey in
order to limit cooperation among the Kurds in other countries. The relation
between the Syrian regime and the Syrian Kurds had been fluctuating over the
years based on the regime’s interests. At the beginning of President Hafez AlAssad’s reign, he created connections with a number of their religious figures
and allowed them to form community-based organisations. Nevertheless, he
ignored the stateless Kurds who were denationalised in 1960s and denied their
legal rights and continued to expel Kurds from their lands and re-settle Arabs
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in theirs. Additionally, any attempts to gain more rights were suppressed by the
regime, besides arbitrary detention of Kurdish activists and imposing
restrictions on property ownership. He even created a state of fear for Kurds
who tried to practice their language or read a Kurdish book because the police
detained whoever did that (International Crisis Group 2011, p. 20-22; Human
Rights Watch 2014, para. 4; Netjes and Veen 2021, p. 12; Lee 2017, p. 230).
However, with the outbreak of the uprising, the regime tried to settle down its
relations with the Syrian Kurds to ensure that they would not organise a
secessionist movement, while the government was encountering the protests
that later turned into militant clash. Bashar Al-Assad started giving promises to
grant the stateless Kurds the Syrian citizenship to ensure that they would not
join the demonstrations. However, the Kurdish youth wanted to join the
revolution with other Syrian protestors but the PYD prevented them. Once the
official security forces withdrew in 2012 from the Kurdish-majority regions to
join the fight against the opposition militias, they were substituted with the
forces of the PYD. It was the most organized Kurdish party in Syria to rule since
the other Kurdish parties lack the capacities and resources, and that will be
discussed in the following sections (Allsopp 2017, p. 296; International Crisis
Group 2011, p. 20-22; Human Rights Watch 2014, para. 4).
C. The Kurdish Governance: The Democratic Union Party
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) is one of the prominent Kurdish political
parties in Syria. It might be considered as the Syrian division of the Turkish
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which established the PYD in 2003 through
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the Ocalanist Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) -a decision-making
body led by PKK- to mobilize the Syrian Kurds for its interests. At the
beginning, it had a limited number of supporters, and it trained its fighters
outside Syria in order to avoid the clash with the regime (International Crisis
Group 2014, p. 1; Diwan 2012, para. 1; Ozcelik 2019, p. 5).
The outbreak of the Syrian revolution was a chance for the Syrian Kurds to
revive their ambition to establish their own autonomous state or at least a federal
region. The exiled leader of the PYD Salih Muslim had returned to Syria at that
time, with rising suspicions about a deal between the regime and the PYD to
avoid militant clashes in the North. This became evident with the withdrawal of
the regime troops from Kurdish-dominated regions in mid 2012, and the quick
control of the PYD militias of these areas with limited to no confrontation with
the state forces. Additionally, the regime benefited from the PYD’s existence to
encounter the Arab rebels and jihadist militias in the regions under its control.
It was even reported that the regime supplied the People’s Defense Units (YPG)
with heavy weaponry during its clashes with ISIS (International Crisis Group
2014, p. 4-8)
The PYD seized the moment to develop its governance project ‘Rojava’ in 2013
by establishing parallel interconnected political, administrative and military
institutions in main Kurdish populated areas. To consolidate and secure its
territories, it created the YPG as the military arm of the organization, which
unified the militant Kurds in Syria and trained new recruits. As a manifestation
of leverage, the PYD declared the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria in
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March 2016 in Jazira that is located in Hassakeh governorate, and both Kobane
‘Ayn Al-Arab’ and Afrin that are located in Aleppo. Each region ‘canton’
established local councils similar to the state ones and a police force ‘Asayesh’.
Additionally, it introduced a Social Contract or a constitution that will be
discussed in later sections (Abboud 2016, p. 71; Ozcelik 2019, p. 2-6; Human
Rights Watch 2014, para. 4; Lee 2017, p. 227).
The PYD was able to deliver governance in the middle of the chaotic Syrian
Civil War, which might be considered sustainable in comparison to other rebel
groups that attempted to provide governance during the same period. That is
one of the reasons why its administration should be examined in this study.
Additionally, the PYD attempted to gain legitimacy and build comprehensive
institutions while other rebel groups could not, and its organizational structure
will be discussed in details in the following sections (Hinnebusch 2018, p. 402).
2- The Organizational Structure:
The organizational structure of governance in Rojava can be considered as
complicated and sometimes confusing. However, this section will attempt to
tackle the hierarchy both in governance and inside the PYD as well. Then, it
will discuss the dimensions of the institutions according to the Mampilly and
Stewart (2021) categorization, which are; power-sharing, integration,
innovation and inclusiveness.
The Democratic Society Movement which is also known as ‘Tevgera Civaka
Demokratik’ (TEV-DEM) is the highest institution in the hierarchy of
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governance. It is the umbrella organization under which comes the PYD and
other organizations but it is primarily dominated by the PYD. In July 2012, the
TEV-DEM tried to collaborate with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) to
unite Syrian Kurds but this unity did not last for long due to the PYD’s
monopolization of power and the use of violence against the opposition. The
TEV-DEM established the YPG and the Asayish to maintain security in the
regions under the PYD control, which are called ‘Rojava’. In 2014, it
established the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA) under which
executive, legislative and judicial councils were created in each canton, besides
the establishment of municipalities as a local system. It also established
commune, which is responsible of distributing humanitarian aid and goods
among the cantons (Aldarwish 2016, p. 16-17).
In 2014, in the midst of the Syrian Civil War, the PYD announced the Charter
of Social Contract through which it rules the territories under its control but
without announcing its separation from the Syrian state. On the contrary, the
Charter admits that the autonomous regions are part of Syria geographically,
and that the administration in these regions is a model for democratic autonomy,
which will be part of decentralization and federalism in Syria after the end of
the war. The PYD had three regions or cantons under its control, which are AlJazira, Kobanai ‘Ain Al-Arab’, and Afrin. They have executive, legislative and
judicial councils, and the authority is allocated among them (The Charter of
Social Contract as cited in Human Rights Watch 2014, para. 13).
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Regarding the judicial system, the PYD established ‘People’s Courts’ in each
canton, which consists of two levels, the basic and appeals. The PYD claims
that the courts are fully independent and transparent, besides including different
ethnicities in the system. However, a number of violations were reported by
Human Rights Watch that the judges are biased and issue arbitrary sentences to
get rid of the opposition groups. Additionally, the source of law enforcement is
vague as it is not clear if they are sentencing in accordance with the Syrian laws
or new criminal laws are issued (Human Rights Watch 2014, para. 4-6).
On the party level, the PYD has similar characteristics to the Marxist insurgent
parties especially in the strict organizational hierarchy with a leading politburo.
Additionally, due to the ties between the PYD and the PKK, the PYD had a
handbook of organizing a rebel-held territory so it was ready to substitute the
regime once it withdrew (Ozcelik 2019, p. 6).
The highest legislative authority in the party is the General Conference, which
is held every two years, and it makes decisions through a simple majority voting
of the participants. Those participants are elected prior to the conference from
the different institutions and bodies of the party. Additionally, there is
‘Expanding Meeting’ that could be held in between the General Conference
sessions for urgent matters by the order of the ‘General Council’ of the party
and with the attendance of the General Council members and delegates from the
different administrative bodies of the party. The ‘General Council’ is the highest
political and intellectual authority of the party whose members are elected in
the General Conference, and it forms the lower councils of the party. The PYD
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has dual checks and balances system where the General Council is accountable
to the ‘Central Authority’ and vice versa. The Central Authority is the executive
body of the party that implements the decisions of the General Council. Both
councils are responsible of setting the ideological, political and diplomatic
agenda of the party. The party has more specialised offices, which are
Organisation Office, Women’s Office, Youth Office, Public Relations Office,
Information Office, and Finance Office. On the local level, there are three
hierarchal institutions which are the Regional Administration, the Area
Administration, and the Local Administration. (PYD 2015, para. 4-5).
The PYD has three security institutions, the People’s Protection Units (YPG),
the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and internal security forces ‘police’
(Asayesh). (PYD 2015, para. 3). The YPG is responsible of maintaining the
integrity of the territories under the control of the PYD and defending the
external security of these territories. Therefore, it had to engage with several
armed militias such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadist groups that were
threatening the security of the cantons. Supposedly, all Syrians above the age
of 18 from different ethnicities and religions have the right to join the YPG.
However, such standards are questionable. The Asayesh forces function in a
similar way to police or the interior ministry, as they run the checkpoints across
the cantons, arrest criminals and suspects, and manage prisons. According to
the Charter, they are responsible of maintaining public order and social harmony
(The Charter of the Social Contract as cited in Human Rights Watch 2014, para.
13). The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) recruit women only, despite being
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under the command of the YPG. Its duties are not clear but the PYD claims that
the YPJ is responsible of protecting the women of Rojava and a reflection to the
gender equality and inclusiveness (Ali 2015, p. 5).
Supposedly, these institutions should reflect the rebel’s ability to manage the
daily life of the civilian population, while distributing the goods and services
among the people, besides protecting them (Podder 2014, p. 219; Mampilly and
Stewart 2021, p. 18). However, a number of sectors deteriorated during the PYD
governance because its institutions only focused on the security provision and
embedding the PYD Kurdish ideology while neglecting the health care and
agriculture for example. Furthermore, the Commune institution, which is
responsible of distributing aid among the civilian population of the cantons was
accused of corruption and monopolization over collecting aid in the cantons.
Not only the Commune but also the rest of the institutions were accused of being
biased to the PYD members and undemocratic.
After reviewing the organization and hierarchy of the PYD institutions, it can
be analysed through Mampilly and Stewart (2021) framework. There are four
dimensions that determine the type of the rebel institutions, which are power
sharing, integration, innovation and inclusiveness (Mampilly and Stewart 2021,
p. 19). The PYD institutions can be considered as manipulative institutions so
regarding power sharing, it claims that it shares power with the population under
its control. However, in reality, it applies martial law through which it
prosecutes any opposition, and it has three armed institutions that oversee the
actions of civilian population. The same for the integration and innovation

99

dimensions, the PYD usually dissolves any pre-existing local council and
construct a new one like what happened in Tel Abyad, and only integrate the
civilian residents who are loyal to the PYD. Additionally, it created all its
institutions, which is considered as the highest level of innovation. However,
regarding inclusiveness, it is dialectic because the PYD includes women which
is evident in the establishment of the YPJ and the former Co-chair of the PYD
was a woman as well. Furthermore, it included and allied with a number of Arab
tribes and other ethnicities are included in governance. However, it only allies
with those who are loyal to the PYD and are obligated with their rules, and it
does not include any opposition party in governance such as the parties that
have affiliation to Barzani in Iraq. It also held elections but it was reported that
these elections were not transparent. Therefore, it is confusing whether to regard
them as inclusive or not but it can be considered as fake inclusion.
To sum up this section, the PYD established specialized complex institutions
that is similar to state institutions, however, how these institutions function for
the well-being of the people under its jurisdiction is questionable. Additionally,
determining whether these institutions are inclusive or integrative is challenging
since it only includes civilian residents from different ethnicities and genders
who are loyal only to it. However, it does not include and prosecute any
opposition group and that affect its legitimacy, which will be discussed in the
next section.

100

3- Legitimacy-Building:
Legitimacy is considered as the fundamental stage for rebels who seek to sustain
their governance. Without gaining any level of legitimacy, the rebel group is
less likely to maintain its governance. However, a solid form of legitimacy is a
necessary for a more prolonged existence (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p.
409-410). For the PYD, legitimacy is dialectic since it is applying a number of
strategies to gain legitimacy including narrative creation, economic strategies.
Nevertheless, the quality of services that it provides, its use of violence against
the population under its control, and the fake inclusive governance model are
all debatable matters. Therefore, these strategies and claims will be discussed
in this section.
A. Creating A Narrative:
Since the PYD is an ethnic-based party, it created a narrative that it is the
defender of the Syrian Kurds who have been oppressed for decades and that its
goal is to represent the Kurds’ political and socio-economic grievances. This
strategy is among the main strategies that Terpstra and Frerks (2017) mentioned,
which is used as a foundation to gain the people’s support.
The following step should be the manipulation of the people to ensure their
prolonged support. According to Mampilly (2015) rebels similar to the states
use their elites to create cultural hegemony in order to manipulate the masses
and gain their support through ideological sentiments (Mampilly 2015, p. 78).
The PYD applied this method as its elites always emphasise in their speeches
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on the Kurdish identity to persuade the Kurds that the PYD’s ultimate aim is to
foster its identity and protect the Kurds in Syria. An example of these speeches
is the one of the Co-chair Saleh Muslim in the 7th congress of the PYD in 2017
in which he stated “our struggle is to build a democratic system. The identity in
Democratic Union Party (PYD) is a Kurdish identity in Syria. The essence of
our efforts is to strengthen this identity. In our struggle, we’ve had many
martyrs. Our slogan is ‘Resistance is life’, we will continue our struggle to the
end with this slogan” (Muslim as citied in Lege 2017, para. 1-2).
In this speech, Muslim was sending a number of messages both to the Kurds
and the Syrian regime as well, as he stressed on the promotion of the Kurdish
identity, however, in the context of the Syrian state to assert that the PYD’s
project is not a separatist one to ensure that the PYD will be integrated in the
post-war reconciliation. In addition, the PYD uses the photos of martyrs to
remind the people that its militia has been scarifying their lives to protect them,
and it recruits the family of the martyrs in the YPG as well as appointing them
to work in the communal organizations to ensure their loyalty (Dinc 2020, p.
57; Terpstra and Frerks 2017, p. 285).
It is argued that the rebel group needs to target different national audiences to
broaden its support sphere (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410). Since the
Kurdish population in Syria is not concentrated in specific region, and there are
other ethnicities that reside in Kurds-majority areas, it was difficult to construct
a legitimate governance in the areas that the PYD controlled only based on
ethnicity as it had to mobilize other non-Kurdish groups in these regions. The
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PYD created the narrative of democracy and inclusiveness to attract more
supporters and claimed that it established a democratic governance that respects
the freedom of expression, equal participation regardless of the gender,
ethnicity or sect and announced its rejection of violence against civilians.
Additionally, the PYD leaders always emphasise as well on the inclusion in
their speeches and interviews. For example, Akram Hesso who is the Prime
Minster of Jazira canton stressed in his interview with Al-Monitor that “all the
people of Rojava, including Arabs and Assyrians, are represented by the joint
democratic autonomous administration under Kurdish leadership” (Hesso as
cited in Hamed 2016, p. 5).
To attract a wider range of supporters, it allowed certain Arab tribes and
minorities to participate in their local councils, for example it allied with the
Shammar tribe in Jazira canton, and it is considered as one of the founders of
the DAA as well (Aldarwish 2016, p. 20; Ozcelik 2019, p. 2-9).
The PYD installed different types of governance strategies across the regions
under its control, thus, in regions where Kurdish are the majority with minimal
regime presence such as Afrin, the PYD emphasised more on the Kurdish
identity in the organizational structure and daily practices. It encourages the use
of Kurdish language, embeds their ideology in the school curriculum and allows
women to participate in governance. However, in areas where Kurds do not
constitute a majority such as Menbij and Euphrates Valley, the PYD applied
different governance strategies by including different ethnicities in the
governance institutions as a base for trust building. Additionally, the areas that
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suffered from ISIS attacks were more supportive and welcoming to the PYD
because of the stability and protection that it offered besides fighting a common
enemy (Ozcelik 2019, p. 9).
The aesthetic symbols are also among the substantial strategies through which
rebel groups seek legitimization (Mampilly 2015, p. 77-80; Podder 2014, p.
222). The PYD highlighted in the Charter of Social Contract that the
autonomous regions have a flag and an anthem, which are considered as
aesthetic symbols to gain legitimacy (The Charter of Social Contract as cited in
Human Rights Watch 2014, para. 13). Additionally, the photos of the Kurdish
leaders such as Ocalan, and Kurdish flags and the historically known national
colours (yellow, green and red) are prevalent in the three cantons. Although
these symbols might enhance the legitimacy of the PYD from the Kurds but it
would be perceived as a threat to its slogans of inclusiveness that are mentioned
in the Rojava constitution (Ali 2015, p. 6; Dinc 2020, p. 56).
To ensure broader support network, the PYD used traditional and social media
platforms to publicise itself not only locally but also globally. It advertised its
public services provision with claims of good governance, promoting women
rights and pluralism, and promoting its Kurdish cause. The PYD managed to
receive international aid from different countries and institutions due to its
ability to promote itself (Burchfield 2017, para. 6). It publicises itself as the
protector and defender not only for the Kurds but for other sects and races that
live under its jurisdiction because of its military skills that were manifested
against ISIS and other jihadist groups (Hinnebusch 2018, p. 402). This strategy
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is called a moral strategy through which a rebel group highlights a unified cause
to rally the people around it (Terpstra 2020, p. 1145).
However, the narrative creation is not sufficient by itself to consolidate
legitimacy as it is important to deliver services since governance is foremost
about service provision. The next section will discuss the economic services
that the PYD provides to the people under its control.
B. Economic Strategies:
The fundamental step for any rebel group that seeks to govern is to deliver basic
goods and services as well as stability and order to the people under its
jurisdiction or what Terpstra (2020) called pragmatic strategy, and the PYD
managed to provide the people with basic needs to a considerable extent, which
will be examined (Terpstra 2020, p. 1145; Ozcelik 2019, p. 2).
Since the regime forces withdrew from the region that became under the control
of the PYD, the PYD provided what Revkin (2021) called “competitive
governance” through delivering these services and creating a parallel national
economy. Therefore, it was able to gain popular support because the Syrian state
was not able to provide such basic needs to the people (Revkin 2021, p. 47).
The PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA),
which includes the local councils and assemblies that are under its jurisdiction.
The DAA is responsible of providing public services such as water, electricity,
healthcare and education, besides running reconstruction projects in areas
where ISIS was evacuated. This institution was financed substantially by the
revenues from the extraction of oil and gas, international aid, besides collecting
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taxes from the people under its jurisdiction. Although some of the regions that
are under the control of the PYD are agricultural regions, it was challenging
during the war to import or export, therefore, agriculture was not a major source
of funding to the PYD. However, a considerable amount of the oil revenues is
spent on the YPG to enhance its military capacity, therefore, the delivery of
goods and services substantially depends on taxes and international aid.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the international aid stopped in 2014 and
returned with the engagement of the YPG in the fight against ISIS (Schmidinger
2018, p. 120; Aldarwish 2016, p. 16-19; Burchfield 2017, para. 5).
The Commune, which is a sub-institution of the DAA is responsible of
distributing humanitarian aid among the cantons and suppling the people with
goods that are not available in the market due to the war. However, it was
claimed that the PYD forced the different donors and NGOs to channel their
support through the Commune to monopolize over the delivery of goods and
services in the cantons, and to show the people that the PYD is the sole provider
of governance in the cantons (Aldarwish 2016, p. 17-18).
For the sake of providing education as a service besides using it as a symbolic
tool to influence the people, and in order to revive the Kurdish sentiment, the
PYD established the Education Commission, which installed new curriculum in
Kurdish, Syriac and Arabic. Additionally, the DAA established Kurdishlanguage schools in the regions under its jurisdiction. The Kurds have been
prevented from learning in schools with their own language, and this was an
opportunity for them to root the Kurdish culture in the minds of their children.
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It was reported as well that it sponsored a number of universities. Furthermore,
it hired thousands of workers in the educational sector ranging from teachers to
other administrative employees (Kajjo 2020, p. 6-7; Leezenberg 2016, p. 282).
It should be noted that a number of administrative government institutions in
the Kurdish areas coexisted with the new institutions that the PYD constructed.
Additionally, the Syrian regime continued paying the salaries of the employees
of the state institutions and some regime intelligence institutions remained in
some of the regions to ensure that it still has leverage even if it lost the sovereign
control, and that it would retain its sovereignty when it retains its power.
Additionally, it was reported that the PYD sent oil to the regime (Richani 2016,
p. 52; Kajjo 2020, p. 12; Leezenberg 2016, p. 282; Hinnebusch 2018, p. 399).
The PYD provided the minimum basic services to the people under its
jurisdiction because of its minimal experience in service administration and its
focus on funding its military arm the YPG. Therefore, a number of sectors
deteriorated during its governance especially the health care and electricity. Its
governance provision was challenged by a number of obstacles. Externally, the
Turkish enmity to the organization due to its affiliation with the PKK, and it
launched operations against the PYD to control the boarders between Syria and
Turkey to hinder any communication between the PKK and the PYD. It did not
only depend on its troops to fight the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) -that
includes the YPG- but depends on the Syrian National Army militias as well.
This hindered the flow of assistance from the PKK to the PYD. In addition, the
clash between the PYD and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq
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also affected the flow of goods and services from the boarders with Iraq
(Aldarwish 2016, p. 20). On the other hand, its security provision was more
sustainable than its provision of other services (Netjes and Veen 2021, p. 5254).
One of the substantial factors that measures the capacity of a rebel group is its
military capacity, which is manifested in its ability to protect the territories and
the population under its jurisdiction (Kasfir 2015, p. 32). Regarding the security
provision, the YPG, the military wing of the PYD showed its ability not only to
protect ‘Rojava’ but also to encounter jihadist groups especially ISIS and Jabhat
Al-Nusra -Jabhat Fatah al-Sham- in neighbouring regions inside Syria. In
addition to being backed by the United States in these battles, the YPG proved
its military skills. The YPG’s military advancement is due to the PKK
assistance, which deployed its militias early in the Syrian Civil War to support
the PYD to form the YPG. The PKK are experienced and organized militias and
its assistance boosted the YPG position in Syria. In later stages, the YPG
imposed mandatory conscription on the Kurds under its jurisdiction to limit the
PKK influence because of its fear to be associated with an organization that is
designated as a terrorist organization by a number of countries (Kajjo 2020, p.
4; Ali 2015, p. 6). Due to its efforts in encountering ISIS, the PYD gained
support and legitimacy especially after defeating ISIS and other militias. This
strategy according to Terpstra (2020) is called ‘moral strategy’, which rebels
gain legitimacy when they mobilize against common enemy to defend their
territories (Terpstra 2020, p. 1145).
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Nevertheless, the PYD lost some of its territories to the Turkish-backed militias,
and it became unable to provide consistent services to the people under its
control, which harmed its legitimacy. In addition, the PYD has been accused of
using excessive indiscriminate violence against civilian population under its
control and that also affected its legitimacy, which will be discussed in the next
section.
C. Violence Reconsidered:
Unlike the rhetoric of the PYD that it adopts a democratic and inclusiveness
governance, its military arm ‘the YPG’ is accused of using violence against the
population under its control inside its territories especially the Arab minorities,
Assyrian, Turcoman and Kurdish political opposition groups and individuals.
These violent actions are documented by Human Rights Watch and other
organizations. Human Rights Watch reported arbitrary detention and torture of
opposition from other Kurdish political movements such as the Kurdistan
Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS), the Azadi Party, and the Yekiti Party as well
as other oppositions from different ethnicities. However, the PYD declined
these accusations and announced that it only arrested people for their criminal
acts like illegal trafficking or using violence against the population under its
control. It even held court hearings for those detained, and some of them
complained about being tortured to confess committing violence and terroristic
acts. The PYD constitution neglects substantial human rights standards such as
banning arbitrary detention and the right to have a lawyer in trials. Additionally,
despite claiming that it adopts democracy and freedom of expression, the PYD
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police ‘Asayesh’ suppresses any demonstrations against the PYD (Human
Rights Watch 2014, para. 1-11; Ali 2015, p. 7).
In some cases, these persecuted are forced to depart from the PYD territories.
Even the Kurdish civilian residents who oppose any PYD decision are subjected
to violence and coercive surveillance. Additionally, the YPG is accused of
forcibly recruiting both Arab and Kurdish youth after issuing a mandatory law
by the PYD in 2014. It has been accused of forcing children both boys and girls
under the age of 18 to join the YPG forces. This led to the flee of hundreds of
thousands of Kurds to Iraq and Turkey (Human Rights Watch 2014, para. 10;
Ozcelik 2019, p. 2-10).
When the PYD was encountered by organized opposition, it violated the
democratic commitments that it adhered to. It established local militias for deep
surveillance against those who support other Kurdish political parties such as
the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the Barzani-supported Syria
Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK-S). Additionally, it issued a law in 2014 that
prohibits any activities that oppose or question the establishment of the Rojava’s
system of governance besides forbidding the existence of any rival party unless
it is registered in the canton administration (Ozcelik 2019, p. 10).
The PYD applied a selective reward/violence towards minorities, which differs
across time and space based on its interests. Therefore, despite claiming that all
minorities have equal rights as the Kurds, the PYD established shadow
oversight over the minorities to oversee their actions and financial transactions.
Additionally, some of them were forced to join the YPG forces and pay extra
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taxes such as the Assyrians. Others did not benefit from long-term inclusion
such as the Christians who were supporting the PYD when it freed them from
ISIS, however, the PYD closed a number of schools that were run by the
community to ensure the installation of the Kurdish identity instead (Ozcelik
2019, p. 10-11).
In an attempt to mix between coercion and persuasion to manipulate the
population under its control and consolidate its governance, the PYD renamed
Tel Abyad into a Kurdish name, however, it did not hand the town to its local
residents but instead formed a local council with a majority of Arabs that it
selected to ensure their loyalty to the PYD and arrested those who did not pledge
allegiance to the PYD. It only freed them under the condition of pledging loyalty
to the PYD, and in some cases, it accused those opponents of being loyal to ISIS
(Ozcelik 2019, p. 11-12). This strategy is usually used by rebel groups to justify
their violence by creating the narrative that they are protecting the community
for the sake of survival by calling their opposition as traitors (Schlichte and
Schneckener 2015, p. 410).
The PYD also held a number of elections on the canton level, however, they
were boycotted by the opposition groups because of the lack of transparency
and credibility of the PYD and considered it a tool to legitimize the coercive
governance of the PYD. An example of the elections is the one that was held in
2017 through its Higher Commission of Elections. Unsurprisingly, the
Democratic Nation Solidarity List, which is led by the PYD won the elections
in the three cantons with 94% in Jazria, 89% in Euphrates and 90% in Afrin.
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However, the Syrian regime did not recognize these elections (Schmidinger
2018, p. 133; Ozcelik 2019, p. 12).
These violations raise questions around its claims about democracy, powersharing and inclusiveness. The justifications of the PYD around such violations
are not enough to convince the people that violence is used to consolidate
stability because it is used on a wide-scale and not only against specific ethnicity
or group but against any individual or group that oppose its governance. This
extreme violence led to the flee of thousands out of the PYD territory and
decrease the level of legitimacy of the PYD because the people are obeying
them out of fear not because of believing that it is the legitimate ruler. With less
loyal population, it is challenging to sustain governance especially with the
intention of the regime to retain its control over the PYD territories. This
concern is raised especially with the resurgent of ISIS again in Syria, and that it
might use the lack of loyalty among non-Kurds to fight back the PYD
(International Crisis Group 2022, p. 29-31).
4- Questioning External Support:
A rebel group needs external support for financial matters and also to
consolidate its cause internationally (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410).
However, the external support to the PYD is sometimes not confirmed and
inconsistent, which will be elaborated in this section.
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A. Relations with Kurdish Political Movements:
Since Kurds are a diaspora, some of the Kurdish organizations collaborate with
each other with the ultimate ambition to create a single nation-state. The PYD
was initially established with the help of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) as mentioned before in the chapter. The PKK provided the PYD not only
with administrative assistance but also with military one that included experts
for training, and high ranked combatants to fight with the YPG (Ozcelik 2019,
p. 2-7). Despite the strong ties and influence between the PYD and the PKK,
the PYD always attempts to show that it is independent from the PKK.
However, its claims are not convincing since they both belong to the same
umbrella organization of the KCK, and all the Kurdish organizations that are
affiliated to the KCK have the same ideological program. Additionally, it was
reported that the PKK militias were present with the YPG not only to train them
but fought with them against the jihadist militias (Kaya and Lowe 2017, p. 279;
International Crisis Group 2014, p. 5-7).
However, the PYD was trying to conceal such affiliation to ensure that it has
more chances to get integrated in the post-war reconciliation, and it manifested
this independence during its operations with the United States against ISIS. The
international campaign against ISIS was considered as a turning point for the
PYD and its relations with the international community, which accepted to
collaborate with it only for this purpose. The PYD realized that it needed to
avoid being associated with an organization that is designated as a terrorist
organization in order not to be deprived from gaining international support. One
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of the senior members in the TEV-DEM announced that the PYD alienates itself
from any struggles outside the Syrian territory, and it would not involve itself
in a clash not its. Nevertheless, the PYD officials always highlight that the PYD
follows the doctrine of Ocalan, the Turkish Kurd rebel, who is the founder of
the PKK, but they claimed that the PYD is applying the teachings of Ocalan in
a different way than the PKK (Allsopp 2017, p. 301; Khalil 2017 para. 8;
Ozcelik 2019, p. 8).
On the other hand, the PYD has profound issues with the other Kurdish
organizations inside Syria and outside as well especially with the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barzani in Iraq which is a major party in
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdish parties that have
affiliation with Barzani in Syria. The inability to collaborate together led to
tension between both sides as the KRG in 2013 prevented the flow of food and
gas to the Syrian side, which is under the control of the PYD. The people under
the jurisdiction of the PYD became upset of the lack of goods and services and
fled to the Iraqi side, which harmed its governance and legitimacy. From the
PYD side, it detained a number of those who are affiliated with the KDP and
fabricated a criminal record against them, which also affected its credibility (Ali
2015, p. 6; International Crisis Group 2014, p. 10-11).
B. Relations with International Actors:
The PYD does not have a direct support from a foreign country to sustain its
governance in Syria. The PYD sought to get closer ties to multiple international
actors such as the United States and Russia to gain international legitimization,
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which will help them in consolidating its position in the post-war negotiations
even if its relationship with the population under its rule was not wellconstructed. Nelson Kasfir argues that rebels may succeed in their cause even
with mistreating the population under their control because of other factors such
as the foreign support (Kasfir as cited in Ozcelik 2019, p. 13).
At the beginning of the war, the PYD was neglected by the international actors,
however, the United States and other actors started collaborating with it to fight
ISIS, which helped it to temporarily consolidate its legitimacy (Netjes and Veen
2021, p. 7). It was thought for a period of time that the PYD consolidated its
leverage over major parts of northern and eastern Syria due to the support and
intervention of the US troops in Syria in 2014 that targeted ISIS militias in
alliance with the YPG. Additionally, the military advancement of the YPG
against ISIS granted the PYD a degree of international support from the United
States mainly, in addition to Russia, France and Germany, which supported it
to acquire further achievements against ISIS and supplied it with heavy
machinery, despite the Turkish opposition to its empowerment. That is because
Turkey considers the PYD as a mirror to the PKK and its progress will empower
the PKK in Turkey. The YPG was included in a more inclusive organization,
which is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that includes fighters from
different sects to encounter ISIS under the leadership of the YPG especially
with the Turkish discontent and losing interest in getting involved in the Syrian
complex political arena (Burchfield 2017, para. 2; Ozcelik 2019, p. 2-12; Kajjo
2020, p. 14).
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However, the American support did not last for long after getting rid of ISIS
because it substantially supported the PYD -as being part of the Syrian
Democratic Council (SDC)- to fight ISIS in Syria because of the growing
danger of its militias worldwide. Since the United States did not want to employ
a large number of its troops, it needed to collaborate with other militias on the
Syrian ground, which have experience in fighting such as the YPG.
Additionally, the United States sought to counter and balance the Iranian
influence in Syria by supporting the SDF as it supported the SDF financially
and tactically to achieve its interests at that point but did not provide any
assistance in governance or development, which was an indication of its shortterm alliance with the SDC and the PYD. With the decline of the threat of ISIS,
the United States started losing interest in supporting the SDC and the PYD
especially with the Turkish discontent. Additionally, if the United States
continued supporting the PYD, that would be considered as an admittance to
the PKK as well because of their alliance. The US administration at that time
preferred to withdrew from the Syrian conflict not only withdrawing its troops
but also reducing its support to the PYD gradually because it had other priorities
in its foreign policy agenda and did not want to engage itself in such obscure
conflict (Gunter 2015, p. 109; Balanche 2018, p. 1-11).
Regarding Russia, it implied in a number of occasions that it welcomes the
inclusion of the Kurds in the post-war agreement settlement. However, it should
be noted that Russia was trying to attract the Kurds to its side to minimize the
US influence inside Syria. It even held a number of talks that included the SDF
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to reach an agreement with the regime but they all ended with no results
(Burchfield 2017, para. 2; Ozcelik 2019, p. 2-12; Kajjo 2020, p. 14).
On the other hand, Turkey has an enmity with the PYD and designated the PYD
as a terrorist group because of its ties with the PKK. It believed that if the PYD
became powerful in Syria that will strengthen the PKK. Therefore, it provided
assistance to several militias that have enmity with the Kurds such as the Free
Syrian Army (Gunter 2015, p. 106; Burchfield 2017, para. 1). Besides the
attacks of the militias that are sponsored by Turkey, the PYD dominance was
threatened directly by Turkey with Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016,
Operation Olive Branch in 2018, and Operation Peace Spring 2019, which
forced the YPG and the PYD to withdrew from Afrin and other key territories
to the Turkish-backed militias. Turkey also displaced Kurds from the territorial
area and substituted them with Arabs to change the demography of this area.
This withdrawal harmed not only the military strength of the YPG but also the
negotiation position of the PYD in the post-war stages with the regime, besides
showing the inability of the PYD to sustain governance without foreign support.
This highlighted the reality of the PYD governance that was not a product of
rebel victory against the regime or gaining major legitimacy from the population
under its control but was a mere seizing of the regime weakness and lack of
interest to engage in a clash with the Kurds because of having other major
battels, besides the initial foreign support especially from the United States
(Kajjo 2020, p. 11; Ozcelik 2019, p. 13-14).
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5- Questioning Participation in the Post-Conflict Political Life:
After examining the relation of the PYD with both the population under its
control and international actors, this raises the question around the relation with
the regime as well since the nature of its relation with the regime is complex
since the regime still has some of its administrative institutions inside Rojava
and pays the salaries of the employees, besides reporting that the PYD sent oil
and gas to the regime. Although the PYD has advantage over other rebel groups
that the regime was fighting since it was not exposed to the regime systematic
bombarding, the PYD had several militant clashes with the regime (Martínez
and Eng 2018, p. 246; Leezenberg 2016, p. 681; International Crisis Group
2014, p. 16). However, despite the recent clashes between the regime military
forces and the YPG, it was reported that there is coordination between both after
the Turkish threats to launch new operation in Syria (Al-Kanj 2022, para. 1).
Therefore, it is unclear whether this will foster the relation between both of
them, or the regime will seize the moment to get rid of the PYD’s dominance.
Therefore, it is also questionable whether the regime is going to include the
PYD in the future post-war reconstruction or it is only waiting for the right
moment to get rid of it, and the latter point is more realistic especially that the
regime is known for its un-inclusive type of system (International Crisis Group
2014, p. 16). It should be noted also that the PYD did not ask for independence
or separation from the Syrian state, and it only demanded a federal model
similar to Iraq. However, these ambitions are questionable especially with the
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regime’s refusal of such proposal and emphasising that it will regain the
territories under the control of the PYD and the SDF (Kajjo 2020, p. 12; Ozcelik
2019, p. 14-15).
Conclusion:
The Kurdish Democratic Union was able to seize number of opportunities
during the Syrian Civil War, however, it failed to sustain its grip over the others.
It succeeded to gain dominance over the majority-Kurdish regions once the
regime forces withdrew from them. It portrayed its governance project as an
inclusive model that include all genders, races and religions. However, this
model was just for propaganda and in reality, it prosecuted any opposition, and
the governance was limited to its patronage. Additionally, it lost some of its
major territories to the Turkish-sponsored rebels lately.
Therefore, it is debatable whether the PYD will be able to sustain its governance
and be included in the post-war reconciliation or it will be dissolved by the
Syrian regime. For a rebel group to sustain its governance, it needs a wide
popular support and legitimacy besides being backed from a foreign power.
Therefore, a substantial question needs to be asked, Did the PYD gain popular
legitimacy?
The answer depends on determining whether its strategies attracted the
population under its rule to support and legitimize it or not. First, the narrative
creation strategy; the PYD shares similar identity with a majority of the
population under its jurisdiction, which confirms H3: a rebel group that has an
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identity similar to the population under its jurisdiction is more likely to gain
more legitimacy. It also was one of the major militias that fought ISIS and it
gained much of the support because of protecting and freeing the people from
ISIS, which proves H4: rebel groups that are showing themselves as the
defenders of the nation are more likely to gain more legitimacy. However, it
lost this privilege once ISIS was conquered.
The PYD leaders and cadres are known for their rhetorical speeches, which
verifies H5: A rebel group that has a charismatic leader is more likely to sustain
its governance. It uses a number of symbolic actions to consolidate its narrative
as well, however, the non-Kurds felt that these symbols are not inclusive, and
the symbols need to be consistent with the narrative of being democratic and
inclusive not only consolidating the Kurdish quest. This means that it did not
fulfil H6: a rebel group that is able to create a solid narrative supported with
symbolic actions is more likely to gain legitimacy and sustain its governance,
which raise doubts about their credibility.
Second, the economic strategies; according to the hypothesis H7, rebel groups
who are willing to provide the people under their jurisdiction with consistent
goods and services are more likely to gain legitimacy. The PYD barely provides
the population under its rule with basic goods and services because it focuses
primarily on funding the YPG, therefore, the allocations for providing
governance are not enough. There are number of reasons behind the inability of
the PYD to provide consistent goods and services to the people. First, its
inability of sustaining alliances with other Kurds inside Syria and Iraq, which

120

hindered the flow of goods and services from Iraq, and according to H2: a rebel
group that cannot negotiate with its allies and enemies is less likely to sustain
its governance. Additionally, it does not have a consistent external sponsor that
can provide it with financial assistance because Turkey hindered the flow of
support from the PKK, besides, the American and Western support declined
severely after conquering ISIS, and so it did not fulfil H8: rebels who receive
consistent external financial assistance are more likely to sustain their
governance. Furthermore, it should be noted as well that in the middle of the
Syrian Civil War service provision was very challenging throughout the
country.
Third, questioning the use of violence; based on H10, rebels who use excessive
unjustified violence against the population under their control are less likely to
sustain their governance. The PYD is accused of using extensive indiscriminate
violence against the population under its jurisdiction. It could not provide a
convincible narrative for such violence because it does not only target specific
ethnicity or religion, however, it is targeting any individual or a group that
opposes its governance. The use of violence harm the legitimacy of the rebel
group because the people will be feeling unsafe inside its territory, and this in
turn will decrease their loyalty to the rebel group. Additionally, its persuasive
strategies are proved to be fabricated, and on the contrary, they confirm that the
PYD is suppressing the people and only including those who abide by its rules.
Regarding its organizational structure, despite that the PYD constructed a
specialized institutions with local and regional governments, these institutions
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did not function as a state and they were only for propaganda to gain internal
and external support. Therefore, it did not fulfil H13: The more the rebel
institutions mimic the state institutions, the more the rebel group sustains its
governance.
The PYD gained legitimacy at some point from different sources, however, it
could not sustain this legitimacy. It is not clear whether Bashar Al-Assad regime
will allow the PYD to be integrated in the state system with its declining
legitimacy or the national army will retain all the territories under the PYD
control and suspend their activities. What could be presumed is that it will not
be integrated as Hezbollah with its controlling power over the Lebanese
political life, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: Comparing Hezbollah Governance Sustainability and the
Kurdish Democratic Union Party Governance
Introduction:
The main aim of this research is to explore the factors that impact the
sustainability of rebel governance. Therefore, after examining the governance
of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) governance
in Syria using the hypotheses developed in the theoretical framework, the
rebels’ sustainability factors can be drawn by comparing the two case studies.
The chapter will assess how Hezbollah exists until now and the possibility of
the PYD to participate in the post-conflict political life in Syria.
First of all, it should be considered that both groups share similar background
of marginalization and being identity-based groups. This led them to using a
number of similar strategies to gain legitimacy, which will be discussed in
details in the chapter. However, the dynamics surrounding both of them were
different, and the selection of their strategies was not the same. It is evident after
discussing both cases that Hezbollah has more potentiality to sustain its
governance even after the end of the war compared to the PYD, which is still
unclear whether it will be included in the post-war order or not. That is because
the PYD is not delivering goods and services consistently to the people under
its control, not flexible to change its strategies and to create alliances, and
importantly, it cannot be expected if Bashar Al-Aassad will accept to share the
power with another party.
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This chapter will discuss why Hezbollah can be considered as more sustainable
than the PYD and what are the factors that contribute to this sustainability.
Therefore, first, the chapter will compare the organizational structure of both
cases, and examine whether the differences between the institutional
organization can contribute to sustainability or not. Second, it will compare the
different legitimacy-gaining strategies that both conducted, and how being
flexible in modifying the strategies is important to sustain legitimacy. Third, it
will examine whether constructing sustainable relation with external sponsors
contribute to sustainability or not. Finally, it will conclude the set of strategies
that contribute to sustainable rebel governance and integration after war.
1- The Organizational Structure:
The rebels’ ability to construct a well-organized institutional structure is a
foundational stage to implement their strategies to gain legitimacy and sustain
governance. As mentioned before, these institutions are built to serve the grand
agenda of the rebel group (Podder 2014, p. 219).
Both Hezbollah and the PYD constructed specialized institutions for
administration and delivering services, and both as well have political and
military wings, which have hierarchy and organized structure that are built to
serve their ideology. However, as it is evident in the cases’ chapters, Hezbollah
gives more attention to its service institutions than the PYD as it constructed a
holistic network to deliver services for its constituencies. Even after the end of
the war and the existence of a central government, Hezbollah is still providing
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services to its influence zones in Lebanon. This is one of the main reasons why
Hezbollah maintains wide popular support and legitimacy mainly among
Shiites. On the other hand, the PYD prioritizes the organizational structure of
its party and the YPG, and this is evident in funding these institutions more than
the service institutions. Nevertheless, it focuses on the service institutions that
are responsible for manipulating the masses such as the educational sector to
embed its ideology in the younger generation. Despite constructing parallel
governmental institutions, these institutions are not functioning like state
institutions in terms of providing the people with consistent goods and services.
Moving from constructing a solid chain of institutions to the participation of
civilian population in the rebels’ institutions. Hezbollah did not allow the
civilian population to participate in decision-making during the war, and it only
allowed those who are members in the party to have active role. Additionally,
the membership in such institutions was exclusive to Shiite Men, and elections
were only conducted on the party level in the General Congress. Civilian
population was only employees in Hezbollah’s institutions, which was a source
of income to the population under the jurisdiction of Hezbollah. On the other
hand, the PYD claims that it adopts inclusive and democratic values and
initiated formal procedures such as elections for local and regional councils to
gain more legitimacy. However, it was reported that these elections were
manipulated for the sake of the PYD candidates, and that these elections were
only conducted to manipulate the masses and to gain international support. Even
the local councils that the PYD claimed that they are inclusive, it just allowed
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its non-Kurd allies to participate in these institutions and eliminated any
opposition group, which is a fake inclusion. This means that both groups are not
inclusive and the populations under their jurisdiction do not have an active role
in decision-making, which means that the participation of civilian population is
not a decisive criterion in this research.
For Mampilly and Stewart (2021), the capacity of the rebel’s institutions is
resembled in its ability to both distribute public goods as well as being able
militarily to defend its people (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, p. 18). However,
the PYD lacks these criteria as it cannot sustain delivering consistent services
to the people and it lost some of its territories to the Turkish sponsored rebels,
which means that its institutions are more fragile than the institutions of
Hezbollah which is capable of fulfilling the two criteria. The reasons behind
this fragility will be discussed in the following sections.
2- Legitimacy-Building:
As mentioned in the previous chapters, gaining legitimacy is a process that is
based on the interaction between the legitimacy-seeker actor and the targeted
audience or the ruled. To gain the trust and acceptance from the people,
cumulative actions should be conducted. However, the ruling actor should be
flexible to adjust such actions through time and space, otherwise, it might lose
its legitimacy (Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 670-678; Schlichte and Schneckener 2015,
p. 413).
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The main difference between Hezbollah’s strategies to gain legitimacy and the
PYD’s is that Hezbollah was and still flexible in adjusting such strategies to
sustain its legitimacy and prolong its existence, which will be discussed in
details in the following sections.
A. Creating A Narrative:
Since both Hezbollah and the PYD are identity-based groups, they used similar
narrative creation strategies. They both created the narrative of being the
representative of an under-represented socio-economic deprived group in their
communities who aims at liberating its followers from the oppression that they
suffered from, which is a fundamental strategy according to Terpstra and Frerks
(2017). However, they had to deal with the other ethnicities, sects and religions
that exist in their influence zones. Therefore, Hezbollah after the end of the war
started to publicize being open to engage in a community dialogue and allied
with different parties and tribes from different sects in the post-war elections.
On the other hand, the PYD publicized being inclusive and democratic and
engaged Arabs and other ethnicities in its governance institutions. However, it
was reported that such inclusion was fake and that the PYD only included nonKurds who pledged allegiance to it, and if they rejected any of the rules of the
party, they would be eliminated from the governing councils. Hezbollah was
more flexible than the PYD and changed its strategy through allying with
different sects and religions to survive after war.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that during the Lebanese Civil War the majority
of the population under the jurisdiction of Hezbollah was Shiites, which helped
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it to construct an identity-based system of governance, and later after the war
and after having a wide-popular base, it started targeting other audience. On the
contrary, the PYD has different identities under its jurisdiction which is
challenging for a rebel group during a war to choose whether to spread and root
its identity or include others.
Both groups as well used the otherization strategy that Terpstra and Frerks
(2017) discussed as well, by creating a common enemy that needs to be
encountered to protect the nation. For Hezbollah, it was created initially to resist
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and since the threat of Israel exists until now,
this strategy is still valid for sustaining its legitimacy. For the PYD, the common
enemy was mainly ISIS, and it gained wide popularity from different ethnicities
because of being considered as the savior of the nation from terrorists, but when
ISIS receded for a time, this strategy declined as well especially with the use of
extensive violence against its population. However, with the current recurrence
of ISIS again in Syria, it is questionable if the PYD will encounter it again to
foster its legitimacy which is already declining, or it does not have enough
power to defeat ISIS again.
To consolidate these narratives a charismatic leader is needed according to
Terpstra and Frerks (2017) and Schlichte and Schneckener (2015) to mobilize
the people around the group. For Hezbollah, one of its charismatic leaders is
Hassan Nasrallah, who is the current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and he is
known of his rhetoric speeches as mentioned in Hezbollah’s chapter. He is very
influential, and for the majority of the Shiites, he is considered as their leader.
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For the PYD, there are a number of influential leaders such as Saleh Muslim,
the former co-chair of the party, and many of the leaders emphasize on the
teachings of Ocalan, the Turkish Kurdish leader, whose rules are the foundation
of constructing the PYD. However, it is questionable whether these leaders are
as influential as Nasrallah.
In addition, in order to promote the narrative, aesthetic symbols are required to
embed the narrative in the daily life of the population under their jurisdiction.
Both Hezbollah and the PYD created slogans, photos of martyrdom, parades,
and special festivals that reflect their identity. This strategy was successful for
Hezbollah to gain wide popular support from Shiites; however, it harmed the
PYD to an extent because it has under its jurisdiction different identities who
felt that they are alienated. That is because they felt that they are living in a
Kurdish territory rather than an inclusive Syrian territory.
To sum up this section, Hezbollah successfully constructed its own narrative
and adjusted it with time to gain wider support in the post-war period. However,
the PYD is struggling between consolidating the Kurdish identity and satisfying
the other ethnicities, which is a challenge to sustain its legitimacy. Additionally,
the narrative by itself is not enough to consolidate governance as it is only the
foundational stage upon which legitimacy is built.
B. Economic Strategies:
According to Duyvesteyn (2017), a legitimate governance is based upon
providing consistent goods, services and security, therefore, rebels who seek to
sustain legitimacy have to deliver goods and services to their constituents
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especially if the incumbent government is not functional. That is called
pragmatic strategy according to Terpstra (2020). Hezbollah was able to apply
this pragmatic strategy and created a complex network of services across the
regions under its control. It created specialized institutions to provide education,
health care, and infrastructure institutions, which is still functional until now
even after the end of the war and the existence of a central government.
However, due to economic issues in Lebanon, the central government is usually
unable to provide governance to some regions, and it seeks the help of
Hezbollah to deliver services in many cases. Hezbollah service institutions did
not only aim at satisfying the people’s needs but it had a developmental side,
for example it established the Good Loan institution to lend people money to
construct their own projects for the sake of developing the regions. This
sustainability in delivering governance is one of the key factors why Hezbollah
still exists until now because a huge number of the Lebanese depend on it on a
daily basis.
On the other hand, the PYD established some service institutions, however, it
was not always functioning, and it could not deliver governance consistently for
a number of reasons. First, the PYD gave more attention to funding its military
wing the YPG, and did not invest enough in the service sector to satisfy the
people’s needs. Second, it could not sustain alliance with different Kurdish
political movements especially those who share the same ideology as the KDP,
Barzani party in Iraq, therefore, in many occasions, the KDP prevented the flow
of goods and services from the Kurdish Iraqi side. Third, due to its ties with the
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PKK, the Turkish troops and its rebel allies in Syria hindered the flow of
assistance from the PKK, which decreased the funds required to provide
services to the people.
To sum up this section, there are two points that should be considered. First, the
people give more legitimacy to those who provide them with consistent goods
and services and that it is why Hezbollah gained a high level of legitimacy while
the legitimacy of the PYD is decreasing. Second, a key reason behind
Hezbollah’s consistent service provision is the regular funds that it receives
from Iran, while the PYD is not receiving such stable funds, which in turn
affects its ability to deliver services.
C. Violence Reconsidered:
Among the three important criteria that a rebel group needs to fulfill to govern
is the use of violence. However, the question that needs to be asked is; violence
against whom? Rebels use violence against the incumbent government, other
rebels, external forces, or/and civilian population (Kasfir 2015, p. 25). Since
this paper is examining popular legitimacy, the focus will be around the
violence against the civilian population. Violence might be necessary at the
early stages while imposing the rebel’s social order and stabilizing security
inside the territory under their control, and this use of violence has to be
accompanied with a solid narrative to justify such violence. Nevertheless, if the
rebel group continued to use unjustified violence especially if it is excessive and
indiscriminate against civilian population, that would harm its legitimacy
(Schlichte and Schneckener 2015, p. 410-416; Duyvesteyn 2017, p. 679).
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Based on the abovementioned theories, the paper analyzed the use of violence
of Hezbollah and the PYD. For Hezbollah, there was no available data on
excessive indiscriminate use of violence against the population under its control
during the civil war, and it is not evident whether there was hidden excessive
violence, or the level of violence used was acceptable. Another justification
would be that most of the population under Hezbollah’s control was Shiites who
considered Hezbollah as their savior and protector. Therefore, there is a high
possibility that there was not a wide-scale of opposition against Hezbollah’s
governance inside its territories and that is why Hezbollah did not have to use
extensive violence against the population under its control.
On the other side, it was reported that the PYD used extensive indiscriminate
violence against the population under its rule, and even its justification of the
use of violence was not convincing because it was not only targeting specific
group but it was targeting any individual or group that is opposing how it is
governing the territories under its control. This led to the decline of the PYD’s
legitimacy especially among the majority of the non-Kurds population, and this
lack of loyalty might harm the existence of the PYD because the discontented
population would help any other party that would help them to get rid of the
oppressive rule of the PYD.
However, it should be considered while comparing these two cases that the PYD
has under its control various ethnicities, religions and tribes who object the
governing of Kurds, while Hezbollah mainly had under its jurisdiction Shiites.
Additionally, the PYD failed to unify the political Kurdish party in Syria,
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therefore, it always feels that it is under threat and might be overthrown even
by Kurds. Therefore, it might be using violence to keep these territories under
its control. Thus, while Hezbollah was fighting the militant Shiite rebels on
dominance such as Amal, the PYD is fighting the non-militant Kurdish
opposition. That is maybe why there is a great focus on the PYD’s use of
violence against the population under its rule because its existence is not only
threatened by militants but also civilian population. Nevertheless, due to
Hezbollah’s mix between coercion and persuasion, it sustained its existence
even after the end of the war and became part of the Lebanese government.
However, with the PYD’s extensive use of violence and inability to manipulate
the masses, it might not be able to survive and became part of the post-conflict
political life because many parties will seize the lack of loyalty among its
population to overthrow its governance.
3- International Relations:
The external support to a rebel group that seeks governance is essential to ensure
sustainability, however, this support has to be consistent because if this support
declined, the rebel’s ability to deliver governance and to negotiate later in the
post-war reconciliation will be harmed. This is evident in comparing Hezbollah
and the PYD as for Hezbollah, it has been supported financially and technically
from Iran since the foundational stage, which is a key factor of its sustainability.
Due to the consistent Iranian support to Hezbollah, it was able to recruit more
people for its military wing, train its militias and arm them, hire civilian
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population in its administrative institutions, construct a network of service
institutions all over its territories, and even paying reparations to those who
were wounded in its militias and to the families of the martyrs. Although
Hezbollah has other sources of funding, without the Iranian financial support, it
could not build such well-constructed system of governance. On the other hand,
Hezbollah has tense relations with the western actors, however, its leaders
always portray the West as an enemy to the nation and that their interference in
the Lebanese political life is harming it. Therefore, Hezbollah only depends on
the support of Iran and Shiites individuals.
On the other side, the PYD did not obtain such regular support. That is because
the PKK, which is considered as the founder and main supporter of the PYD despite its denial- cannot finance the PYD similar to Iran. The PKK is already
restrained and struggling in Turkey, does not have enough funding, and is
hindered from sending assistance to the PYD because of the Turkish troops and
its Syrian allies that controlled the territorial lands between Syria and Turkey.
Additionally, the PYD does not have stable relations with other Kurdish
political parties in Iraq, which hindered the flow of food and services to the
PYD’s territory several times. Regarding the western support, the United States
supported the PYD -or more specifically the SDF which the PYD is part ofduring the war against ISIS and its support was for arming its militias not for
reconstructing the service sector. It is also unclear if the United States will
increase again its support to the PYD after the resurgence of ISIS in Syria.
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To sum up this section, the external sponsoring of a rebel group is a key factor
for its sustainability, and without a regular external support, the rebel group will
struggle to survive.
Conclusion:
After comparing the two governance strategies of Hezbollah and the PYD, it is
evident how Hezbollah was successful in sustaining governance from its
establishment until the end of the Lebanese Civil War and even became an
active actor in the Lebanese post-conflict political life to the extent of being part
of the government. On the other side, the PYD is struggling to sustain its
governance and it is unclear whether it will be able to be part of the post-war
political life in Syria or not.
To conclude this chapter, there are a number of key factors that contributed to
the sustainability of Hezbollah that the PYD lacks in spite of sharing similar
features. First, most of the population under Hezbollah’s control was Shiites,
which helped Hezbollah in constructing a narrative consistent with its
constituencies to enhance the bond between them and using less violence
because it was the people’s protector and savior. Second, Hezbollah focused on
both constructing service and security institutions in order to ensure consistent
service provision to the people and protect them from the Israeli invasion and
the attacks of other rebel groups as well. It even created a system where the
wounded of its militias are rewarded for their sacrifices, and the families of the
martyrs are receiving reparations. Therefore, this encouraged more people to be
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recruited in Hezbollah’s militias. Third, Hezbollah receives regular funding
from Iran, which helped it from the construction phase until now, and despite
having other sources of funding, Iran is still the main stable source that
contributed to the sustainability of delivering services to the people under
Hezbollah’s control. Fourth, Hezbollah was and still flexible in adjusting its
strategies and creating alliances even with the enemies of the past. All these
factors contributed to the sustainability of Hezbollah, nevertheless, with the
PYD’s inflexibility of creating alliances, inconsistent delivery of food and
services, the excessive indiscriminate violence, and the lack of regular external
sponsor, it is questionable whether it will be as sustainable as Hezbollah or not.
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Concluding Remarks
This study aimed at exploring the different factors that contribute to the
sustainability of rebel governance during civil wars, and how this sustainability
might lead to inclusion in the post-war political life. In order to examine these
factors, the paper had to start by discussing the previous literature and the
relevant theories and concepts that tackle rebel governance. Using these
theories, a number of hypotheses were deduced to test them on the two selected
case studies; Hezbollah and the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Examining the
sustainability of the two case studies required exploring the historical
background of each group and how they were formed, the organizational
structure of the rebel institutions, the legitimacy-gaining strategies that the
rebels implement, and the external support to the group. All these elements
contribute to the rebel’s capacity to sustain its governance with different degrees
depending on the dynamics that surround the rebel group during and after the
war.
This study focused on studying both Hezbollah and the PYD since both shared
similar characteristics because they are identity-based groups that suffered from
underrepresentation and oppression, and as a result, they both used some
legitimacy-gaining strategies as each other. However, in order to conclude why
some rebel groups would be more sustainable than the other, the study
compared between Hezbollah that is considered as a rebel group that survived
the civil war and became part of the Lebanese government, and the PYD that is
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still struggling over dominance in Syria, and it is unclear whether it will be part
of the post-war order or not.
All the hypotheses deduced from the theories proved to contribute to the
sustainability of the rebel governance but with varying importance. Among the
highly important factors is gaining minimal legitimacy because the lack of
popular support will create fragile governance that is more likely to be
overthrown, and the more the level of legitimacy, the more a rebel group can
sustain governance. This justifies why Hezbollah exists until now and why the
PYD did not fall completely because it still has a level of legitimacy from its
followers especially the Kurds. Additionally, constructing a narrative consistent
with the identity of the population is essential step, however, if the population
does not share similar identity, this will lead to polarization and might lead to
instability, which is the case with the PYD. Furthermore, it is highly important
to deliver basic goods and services in a consistent way to its constituencies
because governance is mainly about service provision, otherwise, the rebel
group will not gain competitive governance over the incumbent government and
other rebel groups and will less likely sustain its legitimacy. To sustain service
and security provision, the rebels need a consistent external sponsor as a source
of funding like the case of Hezbollah and Iran, while the PYD does not have a
regular sponsor, thus, it struggles to provide its people with consistent goods
and services. Among the highly important factors as well is the mix between
coercion and persuasion while limiting the use of indiscriminate use of force to
sustain the bond between the rebel group and its population, which is among
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the factors that helped Hezbollah to sustain its governance. Additionally, having
the capacity to negotiate and create alliances is essential because flexibility will
help the rebel group to alter strategies to adapt with the changing dynamics of
the war, which is the reason behind Hezbollah’s engagement in the post-war
political life.
On the other hand, there are some factors that are secondary and need to be
accompanied with the previously mentioned factors as complementary factors
such as; the symbolic actions including flags, festivals, the photos of martyrs,
and the charismatic leader. Additionally, the specialized institutions lose their
importance if they are not serving the interests of the people and deliver them
goods and services.
This study faced some limitations especially while examining the legitimacy of
the rebel groups, for example, it was challenging to conduct interviews and
surveys considering that the PYD influence zones are still in a state of war.
Additionally, the lack of data regarding how Hezbollah treated the non-Shiite
civilian population who was under its control during the war was also a
limitation. Future studies should attempt to conduct interviews at least with
some political experts as well as conducting a large N study to reach more
predominant factors.
To sum up the findings of this study, a rebel group that seeks to sustain its
governance needs to consolidate its legitimacy among the population under its
jurisdiction especially through providing goods, service and security in a
consistent way. These findings are adding to the theories, which stated some
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factors without pointing out the fundamental factors that contribute to
sustainability. The selection of Hezbollah helped in concluding these findings
because it is a unique case that did not only survive a civil war but it continued
until now and comparing it to the PYD with the uncertainties about its
sustainability might help in testing the fundamental factors on other similar
cases to predict the possibility of sustainability.
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